Unclear and Omnipresent Danger

UNCLEAR AND OMNIPRESENT DANGER

There exists today in America an ever-present culture of fear regarding conventional terrorism that has been propagated by terrorist action and poor government legislation. This can very easily be examined as the date 9/11 instantly triggers somber memories in the minds of Americans whereas it is unlikely that most of them can recall the armistice dates of other major American conflicts such as Vietnam, Korea or both World Wars. Why is it then that an event with relatively few casualties has made such an impact on the American people? This phenomenon of fear has become rather puzzling as it a statistical anomaly. That is to say, in general, Americans are much more afraid of terrorist attacks than they are of drowning in the bathtub when in reality it is much more likely that an individual would indeed drown in the bathtub than be killed by an act of terrorism. One political science theorist by the name of John Mueller has attempted to explain that it is irrational to be afraid of terrorism in America. He even goes so far as to say that the expenditures made by the government to prevent terrorism in America since 9/11 have been wasteful and unnecessary, as the threat of such actions no longer exists. Additionally, Mueller speculates, that based upon the behavior of previous terrorist groups, if another attack were to happen it would have by now.


While Mueller’s work represents one end of the spectrum regarding what should be done about terrorism and fear in America, I believe the U.S. government represents the other end. In essence, Mueller would like to see the various government organizations in power simply disregard the “non-threat” of terrorists when in reality such agencies have passed more legislation (ie. The Patriot Act, The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act) and spent more money on counter-terrorism efforts than in any previous decade. In total, 21 bills and joint resolutions were presented and signed into law with an additional 114 bills and resolutions being approved and receiving floor action before 2003, not even two years after 9/11.[1] In spite the monumental efforts undertaken by legislators to increase security and decrease fear of potential threats, it seems that now, perhaps more than ever, people still live in fear of the unknown or the potential. For example, the prevalence of the words fear, terrorism and victim has skyrocketed in the nations five largest newspapers since 9/11. Moreover, the implied meaning of these words has changed according to the masses.[2] People now understand these words to mean immediate personal danger rather than abstract general emotions. Keeping this in mind it becomes necessary to ask, is such legislation really doing anything to first, make the American people feel more secure and second, is such legislation allowing the intelligence community to be effective in discovering and thwarting potential attacks on the United States?


Although the intention of the legislators was not likely to increase fear mongering amongst the American people it seems, at least on the surface, that is exactly what has happened as a result of the drastic increase terrorism related legislation. If that is indeed the case then it would appear that the theories postulated by John Mueller would be an appropriate solution to the problem. However, a thorough examination of his work will reveal that this is not necessarily the case.


John Mueller is a political scientist specializing in the field of international relations. He is most noted for his works published within the last eight years, as it is somewhat controversial. The main point of the majority of Mueller’s work strikes at the irrational fear of terrorism. More specifically, Mueller attempts in many of his papers to statistically demonstrate that it is absurd to be fearful of acts of terrorism as you are much more likely to die in a car or airplane accident.[3] These statistics superficially present compelling evidence but it is likely that Mueller’s desired impact is lost on most of his readers. It is conceivable that this occurs for two reasons. First, the vast majority of Mueller’s readers are other political scientists and are thus not terribly distracted by the shock value of the statistics. Second, while the statistics are persuasive they do not take into account human emotion and cognition. That is to say, people are not necessarily concerned with the fact that other have died but rather with the manner in which they did die. With these notions in mind it becomes relatively easy to see how such powerful evidence simply falls by the wayside.


The other fundamental component of Mueller’s work goes to great lengths to show why he believes that terror groups common to America are no longer a threat and should not be given any real consideration.[4] Here he explains that despite the millions of dollars spent on anti-terrorism campaigns, both by the military and the intelligence community, they have yet to find any meaningful evidence to suggest that al Qaeda or other terrorist sleeper cells currently exist in the United States. Moreover, he suggests that because the 9/11 attacks happened so quickly, if another terrorist group were going to attack they would have done so already.[5] Although these claims are somewhat true, they rely on unfounded and spurious correlations that draw comparison between two functionally different eras in U.S. foreign policy making.


Another substantial but less prominent aspect of his work is his critique of the rather poor communication between the various intelligence agencies. Along with that, Mueller also points out that while the intelligence community is apparently over-funded, they consistently under-preform with regards to apprehending or even finding supposed terrorists. These topics of discussion he relates back to his speculations regarding the reality of terrorist sleeper cells in America. Mueller’s assertion is that, the reason why the intelligence community has been so ineffective despite its massive funding is because they have become ghost-hunting vigilantes. According to him, those who are searching are wasting time and money because there is nothing to be found.[6] As with most of Mueller’s work, these assumptions rely on illegitimate correlations and have used unrelated facts to demonstrate what is likely coincidence. Although there is a great deal of truth to what Mueller is trying to convey to his audience, a thorough examination of the facts and assertions will reveal that there are many proverbial stones left unturned that would otherwise reveal truth contrary to that which he claims.


Let us begin dissecting Mueller’s most prominent and albeit most factual declaration, that being the statistical evidence that demonstrates the minute probability of being victimized by an act of terrorism. The underlying thesis of his arguments on this subject is that while terrorism evokes much attention from the government and the media, the reality is that proportionately very few Americans have actually died from terrorist attacks and therefore it is unnecessary that it should be given such attention especially from the government. As a branch of that argument he also expounds upon the behavioral consequences of a society living in fear. These two points are valid and should be taken into consideration but not without a hint of skepticism.


First, the statistical analysis of terrorism related deaths is compelling as it accurately demonstrates that an American individual is indeed quite unlikely to become a victim of a terrorist attack. For example, using data collected from 1970 to 2007 one can clearly see that probabilistic chances of being killed in a terrorist attack are one in 3.5 million.[7] This presents an astronomically small chance and gives little room for one to believe that they should fear terrorists. In fact, excluding the attack on 9/11 fewer people in America have died from acts of terrorism than have drowned in toilets.[8] Additionally Mueller makes a very strong point regard the facts when he says, “Americans worry intensely about "another 9/11," but if one of these were to occur every three months for the next five years, the chance of being killed in one of them is two one-hundredths of one percent: the posited attacks would kill 60,000 which is about .02 percent of 300,000,000. This would be, of course, an extended and major tragedy, but an individual's chances of being killed, while no longer microscopic, would still remain small even under this extreme scenario.”[9] Even by the worst models imaginable, conventional terrorism is simply not capable of inflicting mass casualties on its intended targets. These examples prove one of the two claims made by Mueller. It is obviously true that the statistical likelihood of the average American being killed by terrorist action is microscopic but does that make fear of such actions irrational?


The following part of Mueller’s argument explores the rationality of fear in light of the statistics previously demonstrated. Additionally, he investigates what the societal consequence of a mass population stricken with fear may be. He does this by again statistically demonstrating that fearful populations adopt behaviors that are illogical and produce adverse consequences for their given societies, particularly economically. For example, after the attack on the World Trade Center many people opted for the car over the airplane as a means of transportation. It is estimated that due to the increase in the number of motorists, over 1000 additional Americans were killed while driving within three months of the attack.[10] Furthermore, the general reluctance to travel by air contributed to vast drops in the tourism and airline industries. Consequently, hundreds of thousands of jobs were lost nationwide in 2001 mostly in the tourism industry. Another negative effect Mueller lists as a result of widespread fear is that it creates a political environment in which moderation regarding policy making is no longer accepted by constituents thereby opening the door for political extremists to gain prominence.[11] This is based on the idea that fearful people expect to be protected by hardline laws with strict punishments. In essence, Mueller proposes several scenarios that demonstrate how widespread fear can potentially be very damaging to a society both politically and economically.


The second major argument Mueller proposes is the notion that because of their inability to produce another 9/11 scale attack on America, terrorist organizations should no longer be considered a credible threat. He speculates on historical examples of terrorist behavior demonstrating that the 9/11 attacks only took two years to plan and were carried out with relative ease and little interference.[12] Thus, if there were sleeper cell terror groups in America they would have already attacked by now. The other reason he gives for disregarding terrorist threats goes back to the initial statistical evidence he provides, that being the fact that terrorist organizations are unable to inflict mass casualties on their targets. The only probable means for them to do so would be to first, acquire a major chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapon and second, find the means to transport and detonate such a device. Although there is much speculation as to whether or not a terrorist group would have to capability to do this, the reality is that it would be nearly impossible for them to accomplish such a monumental task. Simply acquiring and storing a major CBRN requires man power, financing and infrastructure that is drastically out of reach for terrorist groups and even most small countries for that matter. Moreover, if the weapon were to be affixed to an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), costly and sophisticated machinery such as tactical satellites and missile silos would be necessary in order to launch a successful attack. The fact is conventional terrorist groups are too small, too cryptic and too transient to ever be able to accomplish an attack against America with a CBRN. Of course, there is always the possibility of enemy countries providing the facilities and finances requisite to a terrorist organization but even still it would be a risky endeavor with little possibility of success as the movement of known CBRN’s is heavily monitored by U.S. intelligence.


The final argument advocated by Mueller considers the state of affairs within the intelligence agencies of the United States. More specifically, he attacks the methods of operations utilized by the various intelligence agencies saying that the agencies directors embrace a, “I-think-therefore-they-are” line of reasoning.[13] In addition to criticizing the leaders’ direction he also takes note of disagreements at the management level of the CIA and FBI regarding what should and should not be done and what should and should not be said. For example, he contrasts the opinions of the FBI’s director, Robert Mueller, with those of 23-year CIA veteran Glenn Carle. While R. Mueller was primarily concerned with the threats that he believed to exist but could not seem to find, Carle was of the mind that, "We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are."[14] An example like this J. Mueller sees as unacceptable miscommunication between organizations. In order to more effectively demonstrate the failures of the U.S. intelligence community, Mueller, in his typical fashion, uses various statistical means to draw comparisons between the United States and Britain. He shows that while the United Kingdom, over the past eleven years, has spent proportionately half of what the U.S. has on counter terrorism efforts they seem to be no less safe from terrorist attacks than America while their risk for internal terrorism is likely much greater.[15] Ultimately, Mueller sees the U.S. intelligence community in a state of confused disarray perpetuated by ghost hunters in leadership.


While Mueller’s three main criticisms have many valid points that definitely do deserve consideration, there are several aspects of his hypotheses that he either completely disregards or upon which he is factually misguided. His arguments are compelling in light of the many statistics provided but upon careful examination it becomes apparent that much of the evidence he provides seems to have been cherry-picked to suit a specific purpose. Furthermore, several of Mueller’s claims, however logical they may appear, looked have been based on spurious or unfounded correlations that attempt to extract substantial evidence from what would otherwise be viewed as coincidence. Finally, there are considerations outside of Mueller’s area of expertise that he simply ignores which leaves gaping holes in his argumentation. This is not to say that his work no longer credible. In fact, many of his theories present a plausible solution to an otherwise escalating problem. Thus, Mueller’s theories become more beneficial when brought under greater scrutiny so as to add credibility.


If we return to the first argument posited by Mueller, namely, that it is a statistical improbability that an individual would be victimized by terrorist attacks and hence fear of such attacks is irrational, we can see that although there is some validity to this claim, the major consideration he ignores is human nature. It is easy to look at the statistics and speculate that while one may not have a very high chance of dying at the hands of terrorists, the fact is, the chance still exists and this is what is terrifying to individuals. Ultimately that is the end goal of terrorism, to elicit fear amongst the people. Additionally, it is likely that because instances of terrorism are so rare communities have become even more afraid of becoming victimized. They have not experienced the desensitization that comes from regularly occurring accidents such as motor vehicle collisions. This is the discrepancy that Mueller finds frustrating, as he believes it is illogical to be more afraid of an event that is much less likely to occur. Unfortunately, much of human behavior fails to follow conventional logic.[16] Thus it becomes simple to see that while Mueller’s statistics present convincing evidence as to the reality of the situation they are completely ineffective in swaying an individual to believe that their fear of terrorism is irrational.


The branch of this argument that Mueller proposes carries much more weight. His description of how widespread societal fear can be detrimental is well formed and convincing. It is indeed difficult to argue that extensive fear among the masses could ever be beneficial. In reality, it has been proven is several cases other than 9/11 that societies stricken with widespread suffer politically and economically as a result. The real danger lies in the political sphere. We have seen several historical in which fearful populations have looked to extremist political leaders for respite only to wind up in a far worse situation.[17] Hitler and Stalin are excellent examples of this and even in our present day America this seems to be the case. Since 9/11 republican and democrat candidates for the presidency have been running on increasingly polarized campaign platforms in hopes of appealing to a fearful population.[18] Ultimately, fearful populations make poor decisions which yields a general societal downturn thereby decreasing the quality of life for all.


In his second major argument, Mueller suggests that terrorist threats in America should not longer be considered credible for if they were they would have already done so. He bases this claim by citing the case of 9/11, stating that it only took al Qaeda two years to plan and perform the attack. Like wise, if they were going to strike again they would want to do so quickly and that would mean it would have already happened. The other half of this argument is that while terrorist groups are capable of making insidious attacks on their targets, their resources restrict them from inflicting mass casualties and thus they should have no real impact. Both of these arguments propose novel ideas but seem to be somewhat displaced from reality. For example, it is difficult understand the rationale behind the “two years” model explained by Mueller. Why is it that any other attack to be carried out by terrorist should only have to take two years to prepare and execute and why would they have had to do so immediately? From lack of resources to waiting for the opportune moment, there are countless variables that could easily explain why another terrorist attack has not yet happened in America. In this regard, Mueller is mistaken. Likewise, the other half of this argument contains the same flaws as his first argument concerning irrational fear. Mueller believes that terrorist organizations should not be considered credible because they do not have the capacity to inflict mass casualties. This line of reasoning is flawed in two aspects. The first is that it relies upon the assumption that the goal of terrorist attack is to inflict mass casualties and not to display some symbolic defiance or dominance via fear mongering. In reality, the real goal of most terrorist action is not to kill or even to destroy, notwithstanding those are significant byproducts. The end goal is to make a statement by eliciting fear, creating a sense of uncertainty among the target population.[19] Before 9/11 the vast majority of Americans had likely never even considered that they could be the victims of a terrorist attack, however, now, eleven years later people are still looking over their shoulders wondering what might happen next. The second flaw fails to consider the human response to situations such as the attack on the World Trade Center. While it is true that relatively few people died in that attack, the scale and symbolism that went along with it caused sheer panic throughout the nation. It is not enough, as Mueller supposes, to simply tell the people that they are statistically unlikely to be killed by terrorists and therefore should not bother themselves by worrying about it. People need to see governmental reaction in such situation in order to feel that they are been protected. Whether that action is effective or not is initially irrelevant.[20]


Lastly, as is common to most of Mueller’s arguments, his critique of the capability of the current intelligence community in the U.S. has some valid points but lacks consideration to all aspects of the issue. He sees post 9/11 intelligence work to be expensive, inefficient and ineffective. While this claim is somewhat true, the fault in the matter does not rest solely, or even mostly, on the intelligence agencies and their directors but also on government official and legislators. Paul R. Pillar, a twenty-eight year veteran of the CIA, does an excellent job of describing that while the intelligence community does make occasional mistakes, it is the government leader who consistently make ill-advised decision against the advice of the intelligence directors. Thus, when something inevitably goes wrong, it is the intelligence agencies that take the blame. Pillar goes on to say, in disagreement with Mueller, that intelligence actually greatly improved after 9/11.


Having a veritable blank check for a decade makes a difference, of course. The big post-9/11 boom in the intelligence budget -- which has doubled since 2001, according to the Senate Intelligence Committee -- has at least marginally improved the odds of discovering the next nugget of information that will enable the United States to roll up a major terrorist plot or take down a bad guy. But it was the dramatic and obvious change in U.S. priorities following 9/11 that made the most difference. Counterterrorism, more than any other intelligence mission, depends on close collaboration with other governments, which have the critical firsthand knowledge, local police, and investigative powers that the United States usually lacks. Prior to 9/11, those governments' willingness to cooperate was often meager, especially when it meant discomfiting local interests. After 9/11, however, U.S. officials could pound on the desks of their foreign counterparts and say, "This time we really mean it." Some results of this sea change -- successes in freezing or seizing terrorists' financial assets, for example -- have been visible. Many others have been necessarily less so. Future success or failure in tracking threats such as anti-U.S. extremism in South Asia will similarly depend more on the state of U.S.-Pakistan relations than on the performance of the bureaucracy back in Washington.[21]






Pillar further describes how it is a myth that good intelligence can save us from bad surprises. In this argument he cites several examples and provides useful conclusions that act directly to refute the claims made by Mueller regarding the ineffectiveness of the intelligence community. Specifically he says, “Intelligence can help manage uncertainty, defining its scope and specifying what is known and what is likely to stay unknown. It can distinguish true uncertainty from simple ignorance by systematically assembling all available information, but it cannot eliminate uncertainty and it cannot prevent all surprises, including some big ones. Leaders must accept this reality; they must expect -- and prepare -- to be surprised.”[22] As an expert in the field, Pillar provides a detailed analysis of the reality of the intelligence communities’ ability to mitigate uncertainty and clearly shows what is a realistic expectation and what is not.

What can be determined from our examination of John Mueller’s ideas regarding the irrational fear of terrorism is essentially three-fold. First, we learned that while there are many statistical examples all pointing to the fact that there is a very miniscule chance dying in a terrorist attack, these examples fail to consider the true goals of terrorism. It is simple to present facts and figures and point out the rationality of a given situation, which is precisely what Mueller does. The unfortunately his point fails to consider that irrationality of human nature. That is to say, the vast majority of people will not be compelled to behave differently after examining the statistics. Therefore, Mueller’s argument, in that regard, lacks a certain amount of validity and strays too far from a middle-ground resolution that may find a solution to the problem of fear in America. Second, Mueller points out that terrorists should not be taken seriously as they have no real capability of inflicting mass casualties. As we have shown, the major flaw in this argument is related to the first in that it is misguided from the true point. The end goal of terrorist action is not necessarily to kill mass populations but rather to inflict fear and chaos amongst a population. Finally, we have shown that while Mueller feels that the intelligence community is largely a failure, that is in fact not the case. In truth, the various intelligence agencies of the United States have generally functioned quite well in providing government leaders with accurate intelligence. The failure has historically shown up when said leaders disregard or misuse the intelligence reports. Although Mueller does present true and valid points regarding the fear of terrorism, they are ultimately not useful in providing a solution to the problem.








[1] “Legislation Related to the Attack of September 11, 2001,” accessed, April 6, 2012 http://thomas.loc.gov/home/terrorleg.htm#one, In the spirit of Thomas Jefferson, legislative information from the Library of Congress.


[2] David Altheide, Terrorism and the Politics of Fear, (AltaMira Press, 2006), 120.


[3] John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Hardly Existential: Thinking About Terrorism Rationally,” Council on Foreign Relations, (2010): accessed April 6, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66186/john-mueller-and-mark-g-stewart/hardly-existential?page=show.


[4] John Mueller, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy,” Council on Foreign Relations, (2006): accessed April 6, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61911/john-mueller/is-there-still-a-terrorist-threat-the-myth-of-the-omnipresent-en?page=show.


[5] John Mueller, “Terrorphobia: Our False Sense of Security,” The American Interest, (2008): accessed April 3, 2012, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=418.


[6] John Mueller, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy,” Council on Foreign Relations.


[7] John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Hardly Existential: Thinking About Terrorism Rationally,” Council on Foreign Relations, (2010): accessed April 6, 2012.


[8] John Mueller, “Reacting to Terrorism: Probabilities, Consequences and the Persistence of Fear,” (paper presented at the National Convention for the International Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois, February 26, 2007 – March 4, 2007).


[9] John Mueller, “Reacting to Terrorism: Probabilities, Consequences and the Persistence of Fear.”


[10] Michael Sivak and Michael J. Flannagan, "Consequences for Road Traffic Fatalities of the Reduction in Flying Following September 11, 2001," Transportation Research Part F (2004).


[11] John Mueller, “Reacting to Terrorism: Probabilities, Consequences and the Persistence of Fear,”


[12] John Mueller, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy,” Council on Foreign Relations.


[13] John Mueller, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy,” Council on Foreign Relations.


[14] John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Terror Security and Money,” (paper presented at the Annual Convention of the Midwest Political Science Association Chicago, IL, April 1, 2011).


[15] John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Hardly Existential: Thinking About Terrorism Rationally,” Council on Foreign Relations.


[16] Satoshi Kanazawa, “Predictably Irrational, Yes; Explainably Irrational, No,” Psychology Today, October 18, 2009, http://www.psychologytoday.com (accessed April 8, 2012).


[17] James Taranto, “Fright-Wing Extremism,” The Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304410504575560041353681892.html (accessed April 8, 2012).


[18] “Why Are GOP Officials Embracing Extremists?” People for the American Way, July 25, 2009, http://www.pfaw.org/rww-in-focus/why-are-gop-officials-embracing-extremists-upcoming-how-to-take-back-america-conference (accessed April 7, 2012).


[19] Bryan Caplan, “Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model,” March 16, 2006, http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/bcaplan/pdfs/terrorism.pdf, (accessed April 5, 2012).


[20] Gary Cordner, “Reducing Fear of Crime: Strategies for Police,” U.S. Department of Justice, January, 2010, www.popcenter.org/library/reading/pdfs/ReducingFearGuide.pdf, (accessed April 3, 2012).


[21] Paul R. Pillar, “Think Again: Intelligence,” Foreign Policy Magazine, January 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/intelligence?page=full, (accessed April 7, 2012).


[22] Paul R. Pillar, “Think Again: Intelligence,” Foreign Policy Magazine.