Sunday, March 23, 2014

What is Going On: Rights and Responsibilities

I decided to start a section of my blog called, What is Going On, and I don't ask that question in the way you would ask a friend that you are meeting up with to go see a movie.  I ask that question in the same way you would ask it if you just heard about something so incomprehensibly stupid you couldn't believe it.  
In this post of What is Going On, I wanted to talk about something I have noticed regarding rights and responsibilities.  Recently I read a quote by someone whose name I can't remember, and knowing Facebook, it was likely not attributed to the correct person anyway.  Regardless, the quote went something like this: What has gone so terribly wrong in the world when the majority of people clamor for rights but shrink from responsibilities?
When I first read the quote I thought that it was a pretty good description of the current state of affairs when it comes to the political inklings of most of my peers.  Now, I have thought about this a lot over the past four or five years and I don't think that this quote is too far off the mark but off the mark nonetheless.  When you look at the demands of most special interest groups and lobbyists, you'll find that they all make requests for more of "this and that" but none of them make reciprocal offers regarding what they'll do upon receipt of "this and that."  To me, this is a tell tale sign of immaturity which seems to be a defining characteristic of my generation, or at least the more vocal and publicized of my generation.  Most of my peers want everything done for them and a scapegoat for all of their problems.  Obviously, the problems I am talking about are much more complicated than all of that but I think that simple, one sentence, summarization will suffice for now. 
So then I started thinking about why that is the case.  Why do so many people around me, "clamor for rights and shrink from responsibility."  The short answer is,  I don't have an answer.  If I did, I probably wouldn't be writing a blog that hardly anybody reads but, I have a lot of ideas and that's really why I write about stuff like this.  I hope to get others thinking and maybe together we can find some answers.
Truthfully, I don't really care for the previously referenced quote.  While I think it is pretty accurate, it certainly doesn't help the problem at all.  Almost anybody can identify a problem but it takes someone great (more often a group of great people) to find a solution.  And that is why I don't like the quote.  While it is true that my generation has it's flaws, I feel that these are at least in part a product of the wreck that is our inheritance.  That being said, I think our flaws are overemphasized by the media that thrives on pessimism and negativity.  I have been inspired by several movements to make the world a better place, all started by the people of my generation.  This gives me a lot of hope that we will make things better than we are expected to.  
Let me know if you find a cause or an organization that inspires you to make the world a better place.  

Sunday, March 16, 2014

Live a Life You Can Be Proud of. Ten Things to Help You Become a Man

This post is for all of the guys out there.  Be a man! Stop piddling your birthright away on jeans that are too tight and hairstyles that make you look like a girl.  Seriously, grow up and learn to be a man.  Ladies, feel free to keep reading if you like.  You may find something useful in here.  But guys, this is sound advice that was given to me by several people, mostly my dad and has helped me greatly. 
I want to start out by acknowledging that not everyone will agree with what I deem to be manly but as I said, this is advice I was given and it has served me well.  

1. Learn everything you can.  Become an expert at becoming an expert.  Learn how to love learning.  I don't know how many different ways I need to say it but this is probably the most important piece of advice I can give.  I don't think that I am substantially smarter or more knowledgable than most of my peers but I do think that I am more capable but it isn't for any special reason.  I think it's because I simply love to try new things and learn as much as I can in the process.  I know this is kind of an overarching piece of advice, but it really is the starting point for anyone who wants to change for the better.  Cultivating a passion for learning everything I can about everything I come across has made me a better and more capable man and I am certain it would do the same for anyone else.  

2. Be chivalrous and a gentleman. Chivalry is dead.  I think feminism probably killed it but who knows.  That's an entirely different conversation.  The point is, chivalry should not be dead, it should be alive and well and in the hearts of every man alive.  Unfortunately, pop culture and most modern day influences and icons are demonstrative of a self-indulgent and dismissive man who cares for nothing but his own gratification.  Now when I talk about being a chivalrous gentleman, I don't mean a sniveling wimp whose sole purpose is to cater to every whim of every woman and open every door and pull out every chair.  No, that is not a gentleman and that is not chivalry.  What I am talking about is much harder to convey than all of that.  What I am talking about is developing a sense of pride and respect about your masculinity and learning to treat others, men and women, with that same pride and respect.  I think I will write another post just about this topic in the future, but for now, learn to respect yourself as a man, and learn to respect others for the dignified individuals they are.  And for heaven's sake, mind your tongue.  
3. Work with your hands.  Have you ever seen a real mans hands? Do they look like yours? Maybe, if yours are dented, scarred, and calloused.  You need to learn how to work with your hands.  Fix a leaky faucet.  Change the oil in your car and learn small engine repair.  Build something out of wood that is bigger than a bird house.  If the resources are available, learn to weld and work with metal.  Master simple electrical and plumbing work.  Learn to grow a garden and look after animals if you have the space.  All of these things will serve you well in the future.  If you own your own house you already know what I am talking about.  Stuff breaks and if you know how to fix it you'll avoid all sorts of headaches.  Knowing how to do even the most basic of these things will save you a ton of money in the future and you might discover a passion or hobby that you never knew existed.  The sense of pride, self-respect, and accomplishment that come from doing work with your hands cannot be attained by doing anything else.  You can try to find it elsewhere, but you will fail. 

4. Dress appropriately and be presentable.  Clothing, perhaps more than anything, tells the world how to make its first impression about you.  It doesn't matter if you think that is right or fair because that's just how it is.  People are judgmental and make snap decisions about you the second they see you, so be aware of how you are seen.  First, dress for the occasion.  I have seen grown men wear jeans and a polo to a wedding.  If you don't know why that's not appropriate, you are probably beyond help so skip to the next section.  Buy a suit.  And I don't mean a piece of junk from JC Penny.  Find a good suit, made out of wool, that fits you correctly.  If you don't know how a suit should fit, look it up.  Shine your shoes and make sure they are made out of leather.  The general rule is, it is better to be overdressed than underdressed.  Obviously casual clothing is appropriate for casual occasions.  Second, dress for the season.  This is dependent upon the climate zone that you live in but if there was snow on the ground a month ago you probably shouldn't be breaking out the shorts yet.  Finally, style is completely up to the individual, but there is good style and bad style, so do some research and find out what works for you.  And when it comes to grooming, keep your self clean and kempt.  This applies to hair, beards, mustaches, nails etc.  Really this stuff shouldn't need to be mentioned but if you look around there are guys who seem unaware of it.  Remember, class is for men, swag is for boys......and idiots.

5. Educate yourself.  This is similar to point number one, but more specific.  Education is incredibly important.  While this obviously applies to getting a college degree, I am also referring to self education.  Read books.  Look things up when you have a question.  Learn to research and find correct information.  Learn to read critically and learn to write correctly (And now because I said that, someone will find a mistake in this post).  Be smart and learn from those who are smart.  Most often when I see others look down on those they consider to be nerdy, it is because they are jealous of the intelligence they admire.  If you are wondering, Is College Worth It, click the link and you'll get a "nerdy" explanation from a smart guy I really admire. 


6. Workout.  Really?  Come on guys how can you expect to call yourself a man when you look more like a walrus.  I don't care what you do for exercise.  Probably the manliest thing you could do is chop wood all day with a large axe but that's just not practical.  Seriously though, do something physical that will develop some muscle strength and stamina.   You don't have to be Mr. Olympia but you do need a chest that is larger than your gut.  

7. Develop outdoor skills.  This one may be less important but I think it goes a long way in helping you become a well rounded man.  Again, read some books and learn some new skills.  Man has been surviving outside for thousands of years so why shouldn't you at least know the basics.  Fire making is of obvious importance.  If you have ever spent the night outside you know that it gets cold, even in warm climates.  You will want to know how to build a fire using various methods.  The next important skill you should learn is shelter building.  Shelter is important for the same reasons as fire.  It keeps you warm and it keeps you dry and these two things will keep you alive if you ever get lost or stuck in a remote location.  Really, learning outdoors and survival skills is a lifelong pursuit and there literally thousands of resources available from the internet to courses at your local outdoor retailer that can teach you what you'd like to know.  Start with what interests you and then move into related areas.  Again, you might just discover a skill that you excel at and you never thought you'd enjoy.

8. Cook good food.  Learning to cook is much more important than you'd think and not just because it can impress a date.  First, you really need to stop drinking soda and eating corn dogs and start eating vegetables.  When you learn how to cook well you'll find that healthy food can taste amazing.  It just takes some time and effort.  Learn about proper nutrition and cooking techniques.  There are hundreds of youtube videos that make it very easy to learn how to cook everything from ratatouille to the perfect steak.  When you start eating properly you'll find that you are much more in control of yourself.  At least that has been my experience.  Proper nutrition leads to clarity of thought, lower stress levels, more energy, higher metabolism and a whole host of other benefits that will make your life more enjoyable.  If you keep your body happy it will keep you happy.  Stupid expression, I know, but it's true.  

9. Travel.  Not possible for everyone.  At least not right away.  The truth is, travel is expensive and requires a lot of planning and effort, kind of like most things worth doing.  But, travel is also extremely rewarding and is one of life's greatest teachers.  Learning about yourself and the world comes easiest when you are in a place the is demanding of all your faculties.  What could be more demanding that plopping yourself on the other side of the world in a foreign country where no one speaks the same language as you?  If you can't afford to travel to some exotic or fantastic location, I would suggest that at least once a year you go somewhere you've never been before.  There's got to be some national park, or lake, or something that is within a few hours of where you live.  So get in the car an go.  Have an adventure and make a memory.

10. Love. Learn the difference between love and lust.  If you don't know what this means than you don't know the difference.  Be a gentle soul who is kind and loving to all.  Callous and despicable men are those that are impatient and quick to anger.  Be patient, be honest, and be grateful for those who loved you because you probably didn't deserve all the love you got.  So return the favor and show more love to your family and friends, even if they don't deserve it.  

11. Be courageous.  Do hard things.  I think the biggest obstacle that I see my peers running into today is fear.  They lack capability simply because they are too afraid to try.  You can't succeed if you fail to try, and even if you fail so what?  You have taken the first step towards potentially becoming an expert.  Find something that scares you and go out and do it.  If nothing scares you (doubt it) do something that is difficult.  Set goals and push yourself to achieve them.  All of the successful men of history had the courage to make themselves great men.  It wasn't easy and it was probably scary, but they went ahead and did it and now they are legends.  That can't happen sitting on your butt eating canned soup.  As Albert Einstein said, "Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre minds.”  Be a great man.  Strive for perfection and honor your gender by making it better because you were a part of it.  

What this all adds up to is becoming a well rounded man.  A jack of all trades type.  If you can't be perfect at something, you might as well be good as you can at many things.  

Thursday, March 13, 2014

Think

There seems to be a serious lack of rational thought and critical analysis going on these days.  I constantly see posts on Facebook and Twitter advocating lifestyle changes, nutrition and diet ideas, and political ramblings that have absolutely no factual basis.  That's one problem.  I think the bigger problem is that not only did one person post the article, infographic or what-have-you, hundreds, even thousands of people reposted it, and wholeheartedly agreed with it, before taking any consideration as to its accuracy.
I think this sets a dangerous precedent for the way we interact with the availability of information on the internet. It seems like the anonymity and lack of traceability that is inherent on the internet causes people to accept whatever is presented.  As a person who values data accuracy and information density, I find it incredibly frustrating that so much false information is so readily propagated when accurate information almost seems shunned.  I have encountered this situation many times and have even been criticized for not buying in to certain internet recommendations or ideas. 
Specifically, I am thinking about the political rhetoric surrounding gun laws and healthcare reform in the United States.  I was amazed at the things being said and the articles being written that had absolutely no foundational evidence to support their claims.  Now, while I don't claim to be an expert on either of these issues I do have a degree and a published thesis in political science and international relations.  I think this makes me pretty good at researching facts and being critical of information that comes my way.  More importantly, I think I have learned that it is OK to change my opinion regarding an issues when I am presented with new information and that seems to be a problem for most people.  It has been my experience that when it comes to most issues, people are far too emotionally tied to their opinions which causes them a good amount of distress when presented with conflicting information.  I have seen it in many instances.  You can tell by the look on their face.  They want to believe the new information but because they can't let go of their emotions they refuse to change their opinion and what was once a debate has suddenly become an argument.  
I know this has turned into a rant but the point I am trying to make is one of rationality.  I hope that anyone reading this takes the time to seriously think about things they come across.  If people spent more time thinking and less time arguing and spouting the garbage that frequents the internet we might be able to learn something from all of the wonderful information that is available.  Just try to think more and talk less.  If that is my advice I guess I should take it.  


P.S.  If you are looking for information density and accuracy check out the following links:
Vlogbrothers - Not all of the videos are super useful but a lot of them are great explanations about current  events
CGPGrey - Great science and history explanations
Veritasium - Natural world explanations
Crashcourse - Youtube school

These are just some of my favorites but there are plenty more.

Wednesday, March 12, 2014

Short Post: Travel and Major Life Exeperiences

I don't know who originally said it but I have often heard that travel is the only thing you buy that makes you richer and I totally agree with the sentiment but I am not crazy about the word choice.
Recently, my wife and I went on a trip to Paris, France and Prague, Czech Republic. I can say with

certainty that I learned more about myself, my wife, and the world on that trip than I did in my first two years of college.  I think that most of us are very prone to routine and habit and it has been my experience that routine and habit only demand routine and habitual behavior.

If you always do what you've always done, you'll always be what you've always been.

For me, Prague and Paris were so delightfully different, so new and confusing, so perfectly demanding of myself.  I learned an appreciation and a love for different art, languages, food, clothing, lifestyles, and I think that is where the value in humanity lays.  We spend so much of our lives collecting things that serve virtually no purpose but we do it because it's a practical decision.  But is it a useful decision?  Of course there are material necessities that are requisite of a certain standard of living but I think we need to look at the trade off. I know dozens of people who have living rooms in their homes that are filled with art that is never admired, furniture that is never used, and desperately awaits conversations with friends that will never be had.  I think it comes back to this idea of routine.  We do these things out of tradition or habit or whatever you want to call it but the fact remains that habit causes most of us to miss out on life.  There is a world full of experiences and most of the people I know would rather watch reruns of The Office on their 60'' TV than put in the effort that adventure demands of those who intend to adventure.  To me it doesn't make much sense but then again, most things don't. I haven't travelled much, and certainly not as much as I would like, but for some unknown reason I have a love for learning and while some guy on Youtube can take me on a walk through the streets of Vienna I'd much rather do it with my own two feet.

Short Post: Writing a Novel is Hard

Recently, I started writing my first novel and I will be the first to tell you that it is indeed a difficult undertaking.  I have struggled with finding a balance between between creative but relatable, while still trying not to be derivative.  The problem is that there are SO many good authors out there that have written SO many great things.  I am continually inspired by the absolute perfection in certain writer's works and I have been motivated to try an make every sentence in my novel as necessary as everyone of theirs.  I think that might be why The Great Gatsby is relatively short.  It seems like every sentence is perfect and there is not a word out of place and at the same time Fitzgerald still develops deep and complex characters as well as meaningful symbolism.
I doubt that I will ever be on par with the likes of Fitzgerald but for now I can use him and others as a reference to guide my writing goals.
While at times in my writing I have been discouraged by the monumental tasks in front of me I am simultaneously inspired, not only by the historical greats that we all admire, but also by the community of writers that exists today.  I read about your struggles and hear your success stories and I suddenly become thankful that I am not alone in this quest.
I bid you all good luck in life and in writing and hope that you find what you deserve, even if it's not what you are looking for.

Social Institutionalism



INTRODUCTION


Students of international relations often have had to grapple with the notion of classifying themselves as idealists or realists, but in this rapidly advancing age of international institutions and globalization, elements of both schools are present in the interactions of states within the international arena. While other authors have made attempts to reconcile the dichotomy that exists between realism and idealism, none have focused specifically on the role that institutionalism has had on the realist conception of the anarchic system. The goal of this study is to examine the extent to which states engage in the proposed idea of a newly formed international social contract and what effect institutions have had on this development. More specifically, I will examine the extent to which the development of international institutions has catalyzed the evolution of an international social contract wherein states voluntarily participate in a contract that provides security but requires rights.


Realism rests upon certain assumptions about the ways in which the international system work, all of which are essential in building a framework for understanding how realist theory understands recurring patterns in international relations. First, realists claim that the international system is anarchic. That is to say, that states interact in a system that has no regulating authority higher than that of the states themselves. Second, states are the principle actors in the previously described system and more specifically, most theorists are primarily concerned with the great power states and essentially disregard the weaker states. Third, states are unitary actors and always seek to pursue their own self-interests. This means that states are concerned with relative gains, as opposed to absolute gains, in the build up of power and resources. Finally, the primary goal of all states is survival, which can be problematic for several reasons. States primarily ensure survival through the build up of military power. When two or more states engage in this type of survival behavior the outcome is a dangerous, escalatory cycle known as the security dilemma. Another major problem is that of competition and interaction. As states seek to survive they compete for resources of all kinds. This competition will inevitably lead to interaction and conflict. In this sense, security becomes a zero-sum game concerned with relative gains. In other words, the amount of absolute power a state has is irrelevant. Realists are only concerned with how much more power a state has than the next (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 30).


While institutionalism is also a structural theory that claims states are rational actors, it lacks the inherent assumptions of realism. Rather, institutionalism prescribes conditions which can benefit states if they adhere to them. These conditions are first, institutions can provide information to states that they would otherwise not have access to. Access to information is incredibly important in understanding the correct action to pursue regarding inter-state relations. Second, institutions provide a means to reduce transaction costs. Institutions can serve as a regulating authority on state transaction thereby ensuring that undue costs are reduced for the parties involved. Third, institutions can help make commitments more credible. By imposing penalties, restrictions, sanctions and other constraints institutions can provide some standard of assurance that state-to-state commitments hold. Finally, institutions can serve as an epicenter for coordination in solving multilateral game problems. States are able to resolve the inherent problems in games like prisoner’s dilemma through the use of an institution (Keohane & Martin, 1995, p. 41).


The theory that I will set out to establish in this paper will not necessarily attempt to reconcile the discrepancies between realism and institutionalism, but rather recognize certain pertinent aspects of realist theory and also provide an acknowledgment of the influence and power that institutions have in the international system. More specifically, I will utilize certain aspects of the liberal and realist conceptions of anarchy to describe preexisting constraints on state behavior. Also, I will demonstrate how state interaction and socialization have lead to the institutionalization of international affairs as well as an international social contract similar to the one laid out by Jean Jacques Rousseau.


Notable comparisons can be made between social institutionalism and The Social Contract. A large portion of how this theory will conceptualize state behavior draws upon the ideas of the state of nature and the idea of a social contract as depicted by Rousseau. By outlining the history of the modern state, its evolution and contemporary existence, we will have established a base of knowledge about the unit of analysis in which we are studying and off which we may begin to build a theoretical framework around the idea of an international social contract. I will further demonstrate in some degree that modern nation states are indeed looking to establish some sense of international social order and legitimate political authority via the use of and adherence to the rules and regulations of international institutions. Finally, a description of how a legitimate political authority can be established and effective in an international setting. In essence, this paper will endeavor to show what is believed to be the next step in the evolution of international political system. Just as the Peace of Westphalia marked as systemic changed in international politics for hundreds of years with the creation of the nation state, so to will the evolution and adoption of an international political authority mark a drastic systemic change in international politics.






THE MODERN STATE


The modern state, like most things in the natural world, is the product of years of evolution, propagated by necessity of historical circumstance. In fact, the lineage of the modern state can be traced back to Sumerian city-states in 2500 BCE on through Greek city-sates, all the way up to the modern nation-states we have today (Baldwin, 2012). The question is, what is the next step in the evolutionary chain of the state. As will heretofore be shown, evolution in states typically involves them becoming larger and more unified. As history has shown, cities evolved into city-states. Later, city-states evolved into nation states after the peace of Westphalia in 1648. Contemporary events have shown that, at least to some degree, nation states are beginning to coalesce into continental unions. For example, the European Union has, for decades, attempted to design a unifying and legitimate political authority that outweighs the power and authority of individual states themselves. This evolutionary process has caused the modern state to develop certain attributes that are universally accepted among realist and liberal scholars. While most agree on the characteristics of the nation state, it should be noted that not all scholars agree on the assumptions about state behavior that accompany these characteristics but these will be discussed in a later section.


The first defining characteristic of the modern state is the conception of territory, especially when compared to the dynastic monarchies that preceded the modern state. The modern state views territory as essentially permanent and non-transferable. That is to say that no modern state would ever endow territory to another simply because of a marriage between the two, as was done in days of kings and kingdoms. Likewise, the vast majority of modern wars are better classified as border disputes and land grabs. In fact, the manner in which the modern state treats territory is rather unique when compared to other historical classifications of the state. The modern state is a security seeking entity that will use various means of power maximization in order to keep borders secure (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 32). Territory is essential to defining the modern state, as it is a key characteristic that sets it apart from previous geopolitical systems and organizations.


A second prominent characteristic of the modern state is sovereignty. Sovereignty as it pertains to the modern state is essentially the idea that an independent institution can relegate authority over a given geographical area. As such, this governing body is able to then enact laws that provide order and predictability in the society that exists within the geographical boundaries. Theoretically, the notion of a sovereign nation as was outlined by the likes of Hobbes, Locke, and other political thinkers, has always gone hand in hand with varying degrees of moral necessity on the part of the sovereign. Additionally, a sovereign nation can only be said to be so, if it retains the ability to secure the interests of its citizens. Consequently, failed states cannot be considered sovereign as they are incapable of securing such interests. The concept of sovereignty as it exists today comes in the form of Westphalian sovereignty. That is to say that there is a, “lack of other authority over state than the domestic authority (examples of such other authorities could be a non-domestic church, a non-domestic political organization, or any other external agent)” (Krasner, 2001, p. 6).


Third, in order for the modern state to exist, it must display a certain degree of legitimacy. That is, that the state’s governing body must be popularly accepted as such. Logically this makes absolute sense. In order to govern, the general will of the people needs to be in line with the governing body, otherwise the state will fall into administrative deadlocks and eventual collapse. Historically this has not always been the case. Many countries in Africa have had dictatorial regimes that have survived solely upon the support of a small elite group. This is not true legitimacy. It should be noted here, that according to Max Weber, a democratic regime is not a necessary condition of a legitimate state. A governing body that can be established via codified laws and cultural principles and not by means of popular vote are sufficient to establish a legitimate state government (Sternberger, 1968, p. 244). For example, a society may choose to shift from a rational, legal form of government, such as democratic republic, to the rule of a charismatic leader, in the same way the people of Germany came to be under the rule of Hitler and the Nazis. Despite the lack of freedoms and inherent lack of democracy under Hitler’s reign, it was in fact, still legitimate as his charismatic nature and powerful leadership won the hearts and minds of the people to such an extent so as to lead the country with their support.


Finally, the modern state exists a bureaucracy. Essentially, this means that states have some form of bureaucratic administration at the helm. The idea of the bureaucratization of the state was developed by a German sociologist, Max Weber, and outlined the conditions under which it would occur and also the side effects of the change in state administration (Mommsen, 1992 p. 46).


Weber explained that three conditions are necessary for bureaucratization to occur in a state. First, there must be an observed growth in population being overseen. Second, there must be an observed increase in complexity of the administrative tasks being that are being performed by the state. Third, the monetary economy of the state must be sufficiently complex so as to require a more efficient administrative system (Allan, 2010, p. 172). This means the day-to-day transactions of the state have become so complex that it requires a large administration to oversee and regulate it. Consequently, the development of communication technology has made more efficient methods of administration not only possible, but also in demand.


There are a few important characteristics of the modern state that have developed in more recent years. For example, one trait common to most modern states is the manner in which they act as mediums in promoting nationalism, economic success, and cultural identity. That is to say, that at no other time in history has a political system has been able to coalesce the interests of such large groups of people in achieving the same goals. In fact, “legitimate states that govern effective and dynamic industrial economies are widely regarded today as the defining characteristics of a modern nation-state.” (Kohil, 2004, p. 1). Likewise, one of the ways in which the modern state had such success in its self-development was through economic unit. By eliminating tariffs and other internal barriers to trade, the nation state was able to create and maintain economic unity that was in the best interest of every individual to pursue with vigor. Without these internal barriers, national trade networks began to form between the members of the nation. Thus, internal economic ties began to develop which in turn led to the development of national infrastructure systems such as transcontinental railroads and national highway systems. In concert with the development of these systems, nationalism itself began to mature and take form among the various states, further embedding the modern state as the new standard in geopolitical systems.


It is important to note that while these are characteristics common to all modern states, states themselves are each unique due to culture, nationalism, geographic location, and socialization (Keohane, 1977, p. 23). This is a major distinction between realism and institutionalism. Realists tend to “blackbox” the state, claiming that all states regardless of any unique trait they may have, will respond to the pressure of the anarchic system in exactly the same because anarchy forces them to do so. I disagree. State behavior is not a reflexive action to epiphenomenal pressures but it is the result of socialization and norms that are considered acceptable within the international community (Jackson, 2010, p 166). In this regard, states behave in a very similar manner to individuals. Problems continually arise and decisions are made according to what the social norms of behavior are regarding context and circumstance.


As we look closer at the development of international political authorities via the utilization of institutions, a clear understanding of the modern state as the unit of analysis for this research is essential. Specifically, understanding the characteristics of the modern state is necessary in understanding why they react to international pressures the way they do and why they behave in certain predictable patterns.





THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK


Like most international relations theories, social institutionalism rests upon bedrock assumptions about the nature of the world. Social institutionalism, like realism, assumes that the international system is anarchic. However, where most realists describe anarchy as being quite restraining upon state behavior, this theory posits anarchy as being much more permissive, to the point of self-destruction. That is to say, anarchy will permit states to cooperate to the point where they form hierarchical order among themselves that effectively removes the conditions of anarchy. This is a very important distinction as it separates this theory almost entirely from realism as it is optimistic that the nature of anarchy can indeed be changed.[1] As it stands, anarchy does indeed pose significant constraints upon the international system. States often find themselves in defensive positions due to other states balancing against them. Likewise, states often perceive threats to their own sovereignty that may not actually exist. These anarchic pressures often drive states towards conflict which rarely benefits any of the conflicting parties. As such, states have recently begun to search for a more efficient means to resolve potential conflicts which occurs via institutions. As states engage in cooperation via the use of institutions, the constraining effects of anarchy are diminished. As this behavior continues to repeat with greater frequency, anarchy is, in effect, defeated by establishing an institutional hierarchical order whereby states relinquish power to institutions as their new governing authorities. [2] This occurs in much the same fashion as we see in domestic politics and individuals. Individuals, are socialized actors that engage in a social contracts with their governments, agree to relinquish some of their individual rights in order to live in a world where security is provided by the government. Consequently, a predictable and lawful society is created where a certain amount of security is always present and when actors, violating the laws laid out by the regulating authority, are punished.


Second, states are socialized actors (not rational actors) that understand and respond to the evolution of societal norms of behavior. This means that state behavior is not entirely a response to the pressures of anarchy in the international system but rather that behaviors and reactions of the state are learn and mutually agreed upon within the international community. Thus, states occasionally do things that are not entirely rational but are congruent with the expected social norm in the given circumstance. We will see later that the United States is an excellent example of such behavior. Additionally, states under these conditions respond to and entertain requests from other states that are not necessarily in the state’s best interest but are mutually beneficial for both parties involved. In fact, the number of interstate wars involving great powers by century has steadily decreased since the 16th century. The following list, from Levy (1982, p. 580), shows the number of interstate wars involving great powers by century:


§ 1500’s – 38 wars


§ 1600’s – 29 wars


§ 1700’s – 21 wars


§ 1800’s – 20 wars


§ 1900’s – 17 wars.






Invasions and declarations of war were once commonplace but are heavily discouraged by the international community due to a change in behavioral norms. States have responded to this change by finding alternative means to achieve self-interests, such as international institutions and other non-governmental organizations. Due to human nature, imperfect statesmen produce imperfect foreign policy. States consistently misinterpret the intentions of other states often leading to conflict that could have otherwise been avoided. They often strive to behave rationally but the definition of rational comes from societal norms of behavior. Thus, we can see that the structure of the international system produces conditions wherein states interact with increasing frequency. Throughout these interactions, socialization occurs among the states creating determined norms of behavior that states conform to in order to avoid conflict. International institutions provide regulating power to enforce behavioral norms in the international system.


Third, states possess various forms of power and use them to achieve self-help initiatives. The common exception is if the state is the regional hegemon, in which case it consistently relinquishes power to international institutions and willingly restrains itself from freely dominating other states. Take for example the case of the United States after WWII. During this period of time the United States became a dominant hegemonic power for several decades and spent much of that time and millions of dollars developing and utilizing various international institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization (Department of State, 2010, p. 4). According to the realists and their conception of anarchy, such behavior does not make sense at all and is in fact, irrational. For a hegemonic power to willingly relinquish that power to the build up of international institutions is completely contrary to the realist view. Yet, in 2011 alone, the United States contributed over 24 million Swiss Francs to the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2013 p. 1) and 24 billion U.S. Dollars to multilateral development banks like the World Bank (Nelson, 2013, p. 6). Whether it is in the form of militaries, economic prowess, or relationships, states can use resources at their disposal to pursue goals that are in the interest of the state. Variables such as size of territory, population, access to natural resources, and capital lead to inequalities of power among the states. Powerful states then use these power inequalities to exploit their relationships with weaker states in order to gain advantages in trade. While this behavior is an improvement upon the more historic practice of invasion and enslavement, it still causes conflict among the states. As the role of institutions becomes more prominent, military power will carry less weight and coercive power will hold much more sway in the international system.


Fourth, survival is the primary goal of all states. Specifically what is meant by survival is that states strive to maintain, and often expand, their territory as well as control over their individual domestic politics. Historically, this has been pursued via power balancing and buck-passing to achieve a maximization of power or security (see Mearsheimer [2001] for more information on power balancing and buck-passing). States often felt most secure when they did all they could to be as strong as possible in terms of military might. This way, all potential threats would be deterred which is essential as one state cannot be certain of another’s intentions. In more contemporary times states have sought to ensure survival by engaging in the international social contract. States intentionally limit their own power and sovereignty to ensure survival. They achieve this security by subscribing to the regulating power of the international institutions that are more capable of interpreting state intentions and conveying information. Security is ensured by the regulating and restraining power of international institutions that states, through social norms of behavior, abide and obey. Again, this happens in the same manner as individuals engaging in the social contract. Outside the social contract the individual and the state have complete freedom to act for themselves and act against other but they also under constant threat from other individuals and states. By entering into the social contract states ensure their own survival because the hierarchical regulating authority provides security and order to what was previously an anarchic system.


By taking into account the assumptions that are now in place we can begin to build a theory that explains why states behave the way they do. Social institutionalism accounts for the pressures of anarchy that exist in the international system and acknowledges that those pressures are indeed real but also affirms that anarchy is not a perpetual state and that the solution to the problem of anarchy is hierarchy. That is to say, when an administrative hierarchical system is established and enforced, the pressures of anarchy no longer force the state to certain action because it is overridden by mutually agreed upon rules and norms of behavior. These rules and norms of behavior can only be established if the states are socialized actors. States are interacting with each other on a global scale with increasing frequency due to changes in technology. As the number of these interactions continues to increase, states have had to adopt certain norms of behavior if they are to be accepted by the international community and thus be privy to the rights and privileges that the community affords, such as trade relations and security alliances (see Keohane [2002] for an explanation on how international institutions benefit modern states). All of these actions are carried out because the state is interested in pursuing self-help initiatives. Ironically, states generally all want the same things, which are, security, stable economic growth, and predictability. As such, states are able to utilize institutions as the governing body to regulate and oversee these interactions to ensure that interactions are transacted in a mutually agreed upon fashion. This is where the state is now exercising power, via relationships and persuasion, when in a previous age it would have been done with threats and military force (Nye, 2004, p. 4). Consequently, this points to the waning usefulness of military power in the international system (see Nye [2004] for further explanation on soft power).


Finally, all of these actions are carried out because the main goal of the state is to ensure its own survival. Previously, the best way to do this was to build up massive armies and navies so as to dissuade any other state from attacking and also to legitimize any threats may be handed out. No longer is this the case. States have begun to realize that it is much safer and much less expensive to form social contracts on an international scale, that are regulated by institutions, to accomplish self-help initiatives.






THE SOCIAL CONTRACT


The social contract is not a unique concept to this theory. In fact, the manner in which the social contract applies to states within the international system is almost identical to the way in which it is laid out by Jean Jacques Rousseau in the Social Contract (see Rousseau [1913] for further explanation on the social contract, the state of nature, and individual rights and freedoms within civil societies). The purported goal of the Social Contract is to decide whether it is possible to have a legitimate political authority. For the purposes of this paper, we will examine whether there can be a legitimate international political authority or hierarchical regulating authority. In order for the state to be more efficient and disassociate itself from the conditions of anarchy, it must engage in a social contract with other states wherein all are afforded the same rights and privileges but all must agree to give up other certain rights and privileges. Naturally, this notion of giving up rights runs contrary to the idea of state sovereignty but that is that sacrifice that must be made in order to gain the benefits provided by the social contract. That being said, no state enjoys the idea of sacrifice, so the contract must ensure that all states are free within the contract in the same way that citizens are free in a republic or democracy. Additionally, while this social contract will impose new laws upon states to regulate behavior and safeguard the states, the contract must allow for individual states to leave the contract and return the state of anarchy that they once existed in. Some indecision among the states regarding the benefits of the social contract and this can be observed in the current international system (see Table 1). While some states subscribe to the rules and regulations of international institutions, others have difficulty relying upon the institutions to guarantee transactions and end up acting in a unilateral fashion regardless of the prescriptions of thin institutions. However, the number of transactions that are regulated through international institutions is steadily increasing and there is a pattern of obedience beginning to emerge among the states as they utilize institutions. In fact, the number of countries participating in the UN for example, has continued to increase every since its inception in 1945. Originally there were 51 members but as of 2011 those numbers have swelled to 193 members (UN, 2011, p. 1). Additionally, there are now over 75 major international institutions regulating interstate interaction (UMDNJ, 2010, p. 1). These are just two examples of the rapid growth that international institutions are experiencing, which begs the question, why? The international social contract would suggest that it is because these institutions are providing a public good at a fair price and it has become beneficial to jump on the bandwagon where safety is more certain, freedoms are more equal, and transactions are more fair. All that is required is to live by the rules and norms of the contract. Eventually, just as individuals have subscribed to a regulating authority to mitigate transactions and deter conflict, states will fully subscribe to the regulating authority of a hierarchical international institution.


In the social institutionalism model, the state exists in an anarchic world, much like the state of nature described by Rousseau. Essentially, the state is free to pursue self-interests, maximize power without restraint, and do what it feels is necessary to ensure its own survival. This leads to a world in which states will inevitably conflict with each other due to competition for resources such as territory. This is the same situation the individual found himself in, born free and everywhere in chains. While the state is free to pursue self-interests, so to is every other state and that puts all states at risk. In order to combat this risk, states have first tried to engage in conquest but as societal norms of behavior have changed conquest has not only become more difficult but also unacceptable. Thus, states are forced to pursue more efficient forms of ensuring survival and this happens via institutions or hierarchical regulating authorities. In the absence of political order and law within the international system, all states have unlimited natural freedoms and a right to all things which will result in an endless war of all against all (Hobbes, 1988, p. 113).


In the face of such a fearful world it is no wonder that states have begun to engage in the social contract. As such states have turned their attentions from quarreling and warring with each other in search of a legitimate international political authority. The historical evidence as well as the overall shift in international social norms from antagonistic to cooperative shows that there is a change occurring within in the international system and this change is the international social contract. By doing so states con learn to bind themselves to one another via trade relationships and other interactions that require socialization while still maintaining freedom under international laws. These laws incentivize states to remain loyal to the social contract so that freedoms as well as safety may be maintained.






LEGITIMATE POLITICAL AUTHORITY


To build a functional international society, the individual states must share a certain degree of common interests. Fortunately, everything that we understand of the international system tells us that states do in fact share common interest and likewise, the theoretical framework of social institutionalism assumes that states share the common interest of survival. As we observed, increased state interaction has lead to the development of societal norms of behavior that have greatly impacted the manner in which states interact with on another (Goodman, 2004, p. 10). Also, these norms of behavior are rooted in the states’ self interests. As states continue to interact more frequently these norms become more embedded and states must look to new methods of mitigating conflict in order to uphold the ever evolving social norms of behavior. Thus, a legitimate political authority must be established in order to regulate the interactions among states and preserve rights and freedoms while maintaining peace and security.


The legitimate political authority must ensure freedoms and allow state to be free as well as impose and enforce laws. In order to accomplish this, there must first be a consensus among the states as to what constitutes freedom and law. States should each produce a representative or ambassador that represents the general will of the population as well as the legislative power of the state. It will be the work of these representatives to establish the governing body of the legitimate international political authority. Various positions of government office will be established but more importantly, these delegates will collectively decide and codify what are the international freedoms to be guaranteed to every state of the social contract and what are the laws that will be put in place to protect and safeguard those freedoms (Rousseau, 1913, p. 206).


Rousseau provides several recommendations on how to establish and define these laws. First, Rousseau articulates law as an abstract desire of the general population that is universally applicable. The laws that currently exist in states throughout the world are generally made by the populace and applied to the populace as a whole. As such, the law applies to generalities and is incapable of dealing with the particularities of individuals or groups. This is a beneficial feature of law as it maintains equality by not allowing individuals or groups to steamroll the legitimate international political authority into catering to the needs of the minority while neglecting the majority. Rousseau further instructs that the law is essentially a record of what the people collectively desire, thus the role for the individual state ambassadors. The only time that a law can be enacted is when it is collectively agreed upon and applied to all participants, in other words, equal in design and application (Rousseau, 1913, p. 27).


Rousseau provides one more recommendation on establishing laws. States must establish laws and apply them during a time of relative peace and prosperity. Doing otherwise is dangerous, as the establishment of news leaves states temporarily vulnerable and a lack of peace or prosperity leaves potential for volatility (Rousseau, 1913, p. 28).


That being said, institutions are likely the only possible means for decreasing systemic volatility because they are capable of changing the conditions under which states must operate. For example, institutions are capable of acting as mediators that can pass along information that state would have never had access to without the use of an institution. As a result, there is virtually no room any longer for on state to misinterpret the intentions of another and thus, conflict can be avoided to a greater degree. Likewise, international institutions have the capability to make inter-state commitments more credible by imposing penalties, restrictions, sanctions and other constraints upon violating parties. For this strategy to be successful the benefits of working in concert with the international institution must be substantial enough that the threat of expulsion from the institution would thwart any violating behavior. Finally, international institutions serve as arbitrators for the coordination in solving multilateral game problems such as prisoner’s dilemma (Keohane, 1984, p. 50). The problem in the game of prisoner’s dilemma is that neither player is able to communicate with the other and in order to secure a better deal for themselves, each player will defect and neither player will gain the best possible outcome which is only attainable through communication and guaranteed cooperation. International institutions can ensure this communication and cooperation.


While the establishment of a legitimate international political authority is yet in its infancy, the effects of such an institutions are seen worldwide. Already, the various international institutions of the world have begun to coalesce in their aims, ambitions and even locations. All one has to do is look at the city of Geneva, Switzerland and observe that there are 14 major international institutions that have headquartered there, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).


While these institutions have no means of ensuring state obedience to their rules of operation with military force, due to socialization and social norms of behavior such a requirement is unnecessary. As was previously shown, states are beginning to utilize means of conflict resolution other than war. This is all part and parcel of the waning usefulness of military might. As states continue to develop the social contract further and more heavily rely upon the governing power of international institutions, use of military action becomes increasingly more damaging to the state’s international reputation. As a result, the state loses future bargaining power with the legitimate political authority and has consequently weakened their position in the international community (Schneider, 2006, p. 3). Thus, in lieu of military force, states have begun to use various forms of soft power with increasing frequency. They make appeals and file claims with the various international institutions which then sanction and reprimand the party at fault and while it is understood that this method is not perfect in the way it solves problems, it has greatly reduced the number of armed conflicts among the great powers. States obey institutions of their own volition because they have collectively come to understand that it is a far better choice to participate in the social contract via institutions that it is to brave the dangerous anarchic world on their own.






EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS


The data used in this section shows the effectiveness international institutions have had on conflict management. In Table 1, 1,688 cases of international institutions attempting to manage inter-state conflict were analyzed and the resulting data was produce (Hansen et al., 2006, p. 35). In 56 percent of cases, international institutions were able to reach agreements with the conflicting states. With such a minimal bias, we cannot state that institutions are completely effective in stopping inter-state conflict. That being said, when agreements are made, institutions have had great success in assuring that states comply with the terms of the agreements. Likewise, only 23 percent of agreements ended in issue claims made by one of the conflicting states and in only 15 percent of cases resulted in the challenging state making greater concessions than the target state during the terms of the agreement (Hansen et al., 2006, p. 22).






Table 1: The Effectiveness of Conflict Management by


International Institutions, 1816-2001






Note: From Mediating Interstate Conflicts: Regional vs. Global International Organizations (p. 35) by Hansen et al., Iowa City: University of Iowa





While demonstrating the probability of an international institution reaching an agreement, Table 2 also shows:


Structured organizations with assemblies, bureaucracies, and formal rules experience greater success in their conflict management efforts, raising the likelihood of agreement from 0.51 to 0.76. The most institutionalized IGOs, or interventionist organizations, are extremely successful as conflict managers producing a very high rate of agreement at 0.92. Our results demonstrate that the institutional characteristics of the organization influence their success rates. Even when focusing on binding techniques, less institutionalized IGOs experience significantly lower rates of success in producing agreements. Thus among potential IGO conflict managers, the most highly institutionalized organizations have a clear advantage for getting disputing parties to reach agreement, especially when they employ binding techniques. (Hansen, et al., 2006, p. 24)






The data contained in Tables 1 and 2 effectively shows that institutions have greater success in brokering agreements between contentious states then do states themselves. That being said, it is important to note that levels of democratization, preference similarity, and institutionalization positively affect the success an institution successfully mediating an agreement between two or more contentious states. Thus, it is clear that institutions are not equally capable of fostering cooperation and mitigating conflict among states with lower levels of democratization, and institutionalization (Hansen et al., 2006, p. 27).


















Table 2: Predicted Probability of International Institution (IGO) Settlement


Attempt and Reaching Agreement






Note: From Mediating Interstate Conflicts: Regional vs. Global International Organizations (p. 38) by Hansen et al., Iowa City: University of Iowa














CONCLUSION


Two conclusions are derived from social institutionalism. First, due to socialization and frequent interaction, states have begun to engage in an international social contract. For a long time states have existed in a state of nature where all have unlimited freedom act as they please. This lead to competition for territory and resources and an anarchic world in which there was no ordering power above that of the state. States became distrustful and even fearful of one another in this world have since developed a way to regulate interaction to make it safe and fair and this is done by international institutions. As the effects of globalization and technological innovation continue to make interaction among the states more frequent, states have adopted certain social norms of behavior and these norms generally determine what is acceptable and what is unacceptable behavior for a state to pursue within the international system. With these norms of behavior in place, states have outlined a social contract by which they utilize international institutions and gain benefits from them but at the same time give up some of the freedoms that existed in the anarchic world. This is the trade off. While all states are now more certain of the world around them and the states in the world, it is no longer acceptable from them to do as they wish at all times. The social contract demands that states behave accordingly or risk being denied the inherent benefits of it.


Second, the social contract has lead to the formation of international institutions that add hierarchical organization to an anarchic world, thereby increasing security, safety, and certainty for every state at the cost of certain freedoms. This makes for a more stable and peace prone international system due to its changed nature. That is, there is now a regulating authority or legitimate political authority that can put measures in place to ensure that the developed social norms of behavior is not violated among the states during interactions. While international institutions cannot invade or destroy a state with military power, such action is not entirely necessary as sanctions and reprimands are often enough to coerce the state to abide by the rules values and norms that the institutions uphold due to the nature of the social contract.


This theory of social institutionalism as it yet stands is under-developed and requires much more research and examination into the ideas of systemic change, the waning usefulness of military power, the development of the international social contract, and many others. That being said, it does draw attention to many important aspects of international relations that have previously lacked consideration. More importantly, it shows that there is a continuing shift in the way in which states interact with each other. Social interactions, whether it be on the individual or state level, is an ever evolving process. Manners, customs, greetings and other norms of behavior will continue to change as the world moves forward and as such it becomes important to be observant of the way in which states change they way they respond to one another’s actions. With careful observation it becomes apparent that states are indeed changing they way they interact with each other and that social contracts and international institutions will continue to play an increasingly vital role in the future.


































REFERENCES


Allan, K. D. (2010). Explorations in classical sociological theory (2nd ed.). Thousand Oakes, CA: Pine Forge Press.


Baldwin, R., (2012) Mesopotamia: The first civilization. Retrieved from: http://socsci.gulfcoast.edu/rbaldwin/mesopotamia.htm.


Goodman, R. & Jinks, D. (2004) How to influence states: Socialization and international human rights law. Duke Law Journal, Vol. 54, 7-15.


Hansen, H. et al., (2006) Mediating interstate conflicts: Regional vs. global international organizations. Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa.


Hobbes, T. & Macpherson, C. (1988) Leviathan. London: Penguin.


Jackson, R. H., & Sørensen, G. (2010). Introduction to international relations: Theories and approaches. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.


Keohane, R. (1984) After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.


Keohane, R., (2002) Global governance and democratic accountability. Durham, NC: Duke University, p.25.


Keohane, R. & Martin, L. (1995) The promise of institutionalist theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.


Keohane, R. & Nye, J. (1977) Power and interdependence: World politics in transition. Boston, MA: Little Brown and Company.


Kohli, A. (2004) State-directed development: Political power and industrialization in the global periphery. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.


Krasner, S. D., (2001). Problematic sovereignty: contested rules and political possibilities. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.


Levy, J. S. (1982) The contagion of great power war behavior. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, 562-584.


Mearsheimer, J. (2001) The tragedy of great power politics. New York, NY: Norton.


Mommsen, Wolfgang J., (1992). The political and social theory of max weber: Collected essays. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.


Nelson, R., (2013) Multilateral development banks: U.S. contributions FY2000-FY2013. Retrieved from: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20792.pdf.


Nye, J. (2004) Soft power: The means to success in world politics. New York, NY: Public Affairs Publishing.


Rousseau, J. J. (1913) Social Contract & Discourses. New York, NY: E. P. Dutton & Co.






Sternberger, D., (1968) Legitimacy. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 9, 244.


Schneider, C. J., (2006) Weak states and institutionalized bargaining power in international organizations. Retrieved from: http://polisci2.ucsd.edu/cjschneider/articles/pdf/WeakStates-W03E.pdf.


UMDNJ. (2010) List of international Organizations. Retrieved from: http://www.umdnj.edu/uroweb/international_office/generalinfo/ListofInternationalOrganizations.pdf.


United States Department of State. (2010). United States contributions to international organizations. Retrieved from: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/199431.pdf.


United Nations. (2012). Growth in United Nations Membership 1945-present. Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/en/member/growth.shtml.


World Trade Organization (2013). Members contributions to the secretariat and to the appellate body for year the 2011. Retrieved from: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/contrib_e.htm.





































































[1] Optimism and pessimism are terms commonly used to describe how liberals and realists regard the anarchic nature of the international system. Realists are pessimistic because they believe anarchy cannot be overcome whereas liberals feel the opposite.


[2] Domestic governments overcame anarchy within their countries by establishing hierarchical systems of government. The same logic applied to the international system suggests that international anarchy can also be overcome by establishing a hierarchical system.

Unclear and Omnipresent Danger




UNCLEAR AND OMNIPRESENT DANGER

There exists today in America an ever-present culture of fear regarding conventional terrorism that has been propagated by terrorist action and poor government legislation. This can very easily be examined as the date 9/11 instantly triggers somber memories in the minds of Americans whereas it is unlikely that most of them can recall the armistice dates of other major American conflicts such as Vietnam, Korea or both World Wars. Why is it then that an event with relatively few casualties has made such an impact on the American people? This phenomenon of fear has become rather puzzling as it a statistical anomaly. That is to say, in general, Americans are much more afraid of terrorist attacks than they are of drowning in the bathtub when in reality it is much more likely that an individual would indeed drown in the bathtub than be killed by an act of terrorism. One political science theorist by the name of John Mueller has attempted to explain that it is irrational to be afraid of terrorism in America. He even goes so far as to say that the expenditures made by the government to prevent terrorism in America since 9/11 have been wasteful and unnecessary, as the threat of such actions no longer exists. Additionally, Mueller speculates, that based upon the behavior of previous terrorist groups, if another attack were to happen it would have by now.


While Mueller’s work represents one end of the spectrum regarding what should be done about terrorism and fear in America, I believe the U.S. government represents the other end. In essence, Mueller would like to see the various government organizations in power simply disregard the “non-threat” of terrorists when in reality such agencies have passed more legislation (ie. The Patriot Act, The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act) and spent more money on counter-terrorism efforts than in any previous decade. In total, 21 bills and joint resolutions were presented and signed into law with an additional 114 bills and resolutions being approved and receiving floor action before 2003, not even two years after 9/11.[1] In spite the monumental efforts undertaken by legislators to increase security and decrease fear of potential threats, it seems that now, perhaps more than ever, people still live in fear of the unknown or the potential. For example, the prevalence of the words fear, terrorism and victim has skyrocketed in the nations five largest newspapers since 9/11. Moreover, the implied meaning of these words has changed according to the masses.[2] People now understand these words to mean immediate personal danger rather than abstract general emotions. Keeping this in mind it becomes necessary to ask, is such legislation really doing anything to first, make the American people feel more secure and second, is such legislation allowing the intelligence community to be effective in discovering and thwarting potential attacks on the United States?


Although the intention of the legislators was not likely to increase fear mongering amongst the American people it seems, at least on the surface, that is exactly what has happened as a result of the drastic increase terrorism related legislation. If that is indeed the case then it would appear that the theories postulated by John Mueller would be an appropriate solution to the problem. However, a thorough examination of his work will reveal that this is not necessarily the case.


John Mueller is a political scientist specializing in the field of international relations. He is most noted for his works published within the last eight years, as it is somewhat controversial. The main point of the majority of Mueller’s work strikes at the irrational fear of terrorism. More specifically, Mueller attempts in many of his papers to statistically demonstrate that it is absurd to be fearful of acts of terrorism as you are much more likely to die in a car or airplane accident.[3] These statistics superficially present compelling evidence but it is likely that Mueller’s desired impact is lost on most of his readers. It is conceivable that this occurs for two reasons. First, the vast majority of Mueller’s readers are other political scientists and are thus not terribly distracted by the shock value of the statistics. Second, while the statistics are persuasive they do not take into account human emotion and cognition. That is to say, people are not necessarily concerned with the fact that other have died but rather with the manner in which they did die. With these notions in mind it becomes relatively easy to see how such powerful evidence simply falls by the wayside.


The other fundamental component of Mueller’s work goes to great lengths to show why he believes that terror groups common to America are no longer a threat and should not be given any real consideration.[4] Here he explains that despite the millions of dollars spent on anti-terrorism campaigns, both by the military and the intelligence community, they have yet to find any meaningful evidence to suggest that al Qaeda or other terrorist sleeper cells currently exist in the United States. Moreover, he suggests that because the 9/11 attacks happened so quickly, if another terrorist group were going to attack they would have done so already.[5] Although these claims are somewhat true, they rely on unfounded and spurious correlations that draw comparison between two functionally different eras in U.S. foreign policy making.


Another substantial but less prominent aspect of his work is his critique of the rather poor communication between the various intelligence agencies. Along with that, Mueller also points out that while the intelligence community is apparently over-funded, they consistently under-preform with regards to apprehending or even finding supposed terrorists. These topics of discussion he relates back to his speculations regarding the reality of terrorist sleeper cells in America. Mueller’s assertion is that, the reason why the intelligence community has been so ineffective despite its massive funding is because they have become ghost-hunting vigilantes. According to him, those who are searching are wasting time and money because there is nothing to be found.[6] As with most of Mueller’s work, these assumptions rely on illegitimate correlations and have used unrelated facts to demonstrate what is likely coincidence. Although there is a great deal of truth to what Mueller is trying to convey to his audience, a thorough examination of the facts and assertions will reveal that there are many proverbial stones left unturned that would otherwise reveal truth contrary to that which he claims.


Let us begin dissecting Mueller’s most prominent and albeit most factual declaration, that being the statistical evidence that demonstrates the minute probability of being victimized by an act of terrorism. The underlying thesis of his arguments on this subject is that while terrorism evokes much attention from the government and the media, the reality is that proportionately very few Americans have actually died from terrorist attacks and therefore it is unnecessary that it should be given such attention especially from the government. As a branch of that argument he also expounds upon the behavioral consequences of a society living in fear. These two points are valid and should be taken into consideration but not without a hint of skepticism.


First, the statistical analysis of terrorism related deaths is compelling as it accurately demonstrates that an American individual is indeed quite unlikely to become a victim of a terrorist attack. For example, using data collected from 1970 to 2007 one can clearly see that probabilistic chances of being killed in a terrorist attack are one in 3.5 million.[7] This presents an astronomically small chance and gives little room for one to believe that they should fear terrorists. In fact, excluding the attack on 9/11 fewer people in America have died from acts of terrorism than have drowned in toilets.[8] Additionally Mueller makes a very strong point regard the facts when he says, “Americans worry intensely about "another 9/11," but if one of these were to occur every three months for the next five years, the chance of being killed in one of them is two one-hundredths of one percent: the posited attacks would kill 60,000 which is about .02 percent of 300,000,000. This would be, of course, an extended and major tragedy, but an individual's chances of being killed, while no longer microscopic, would still remain small even under this extreme scenario.”[9] Even by the worst models imaginable, conventional terrorism is simply not capable of inflicting mass casualties on its intended targets. These examples prove one of the two claims made by Mueller. It is obviously true that the statistical likelihood of the average American being killed by terrorist action is microscopic but does that make fear of such actions irrational?


The following part of Mueller’s argument explores the rationality of fear in light of the statistics previously demonstrated. Additionally, he investigates what the societal consequence of a mass population stricken with fear may be. He does this by again statistically demonstrating that fearful populations adopt behaviors that are illogical and produce adverse consequences for their given societies, particularly economically. For example, after the attack on the World Trade Center many people opted for the car over the airplane as a means of transportation. It is estimated that due to the increase in the number of motorists, over 1000 additional Americans were killed while driving within three months of the attack.[10] Furthermore, the general reluctance to travel by air contributed to vast drops in the tourism and airline industries. Consequently, hundreds of thousands of jobs were lost nationwide in 2001 mostly in the tourism industry. Another negative effect Mueller lists as a result of widespread fear is that it creates a political environment in which moderation regarding policy making is no longer accepted by constituents thereby opening the door for political extremists to gain prominence.[11] This is based on the idea that fearful people expect to be protected by hardline laws with strict punishments. In essence, Mueller proposes several scenarios that demonstrate how widespread fear can potentially be very damaging to a society both politically and economically.


The second major argument Mueller proposes is the notion that because of their inability to produce another 9/11 scale attack on America, terrorist organizations should no longer be considered a credible threat. He speculates on historical examples of terrorist behavior demonstrating that the 9/11 attacks only took two years to plan and were carried out with relative ease and little interference.[12] Thus, if there were sleeper cell terror groups in America they would have already attacked by now. The other reason he gives for disregarding terrorist threats goes back to the initial statistical evidence he provides, that being the fact that terrorist organizations are unable to inflict mass casualties on their targets. The only probable means for them to do so would be to first, acquire a major chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapon and second, find the means to transport and detonate such a device. Although there is much speculation as to whether or not a terrorist group would have to capability to do this, the reality is that it would be nearly impossible for them to accomplish such a monumental task. Simply acquiring and storing a major CBRN requires man power, financing and infrastructure that is drastically out of reach for terrorist groups and even most small countries for that matter. Moreover, if the weapon were to be affixed to an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), costly and sophisticated machinery such as tactical satellites and missile silos would be necessary in order to launch a successful attack. The fact is conventional terrorist groups are too small, too cryptic and too transient to ever be able to accomplish an attack against America with a CBRN. Of course, there is always the possibility of enemy countries providing the facilities and finances requisite to a terrorist organization but even still it would be a risky endeavor with little possibility of success as the movement of known CBRN’s is heavily monitored by U.S. intelligence.


The final argument advocated by Mueller considers the state of affairs within the intelligence agencies of the United States. More specifically, he attacks the methods of operations utilized by the various intelligence agencies saying that the agencies directors embrace a, “I-think-therefore-they-are” line of reasoning.[13] In addition to criticizing the leaders’ direction he also takes note of disagreements at the management level of the CIA and FBI regarding what should and should not be done and what should and should not be said. For example, he contrasts the opinions of the FBI’s director, Robert Mueller, with those of 23-year CIA veteran Glenn Carle. While R. Mueller was primarily concerned with the threats that he believed to exist but could not seem to find, Carle was of the mind that, "We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are."[14] An example like this J. Mueller sees as unacceptable miscommunication between organizations. In order to more effectively demonstrate the failures of the U.S. intelligence community, Mueller, in his typical fashion, uses various statistical means to draw comparisons between the United States and Britain. He shows that while the United Kingdom, over the past eleven years, has spent proportionately half of what the U.S. has on counter terrorism efforts they seem to be no less safe from terrorist attacks than America while their risk for internal terrorism is likely much greater.[15] Ultimately, Mueller sees the U.S. intelligence community in a state of confused disarray perpetuated by ghost hunters in leadership.


While Mueller’s three main criticisms have many valid points that definitely do deserve consideration, there are several aspects of his hypotheses that he either completely disregards or upon which he is factually misguided. His arguments are compelling in light of the many statistics provided but upon careful examination it becomes apparent that much of the evidence he provides seems to have been cherry-picked to suit a specific purpose. Furthermore, several of Mueller’s claims, however logical they may appear, looked have been based on spurious or unfounded correlations that attempt to extract substantial evidence from what would otherwise be viewed as coincidence. Finally, there are considerations outside of Mueller’s area of expertise that he simply ignores which leaves gaping holes in his argumentation. This is not to say that his work no longer credible. In fact, many of his theories present a plausible solution to an otherwise escalating problem. Thus, Mueller’s theories become more beneficial when brought under greater scrutiny so as to add credibility.


If we return to the first argument posited by Mueller, namely, that it is a statistical improbability that an individual would be victimized by terrorist attacks and hence fear of such attacks is irrational, we can see that although there is some validity to this claim, the major consideration he ignores is human nature. It is easy to look at the statistics and speculate that while one may not have a very high chance of dying at the hands of terrorists, the fact is, the chance still exists and this is what is terrifying to individuals. Ultimately that is the end goal of terrorism, to elicit fear amongst the people. Additionally, it is likely that because instances of terrorism are so rare communities have become even more afraid of becoming victimized. They have not experienced the desensitization that comes from regularly occurring accidents such as motor vehicle collisions. This is the discrepancy that Mueller finds frustrating, as he believes it is illogical to be more afraid of an event that is much less likely to occur. Unfortunately, much of human behavior fails to follow conventional logic.[16] Thus it becomes simple to see that while Mueller’s statistics present convincing evidence as to the reality of the situation they are completely ineffective in swaying an individual to believe that their fear of terrorism is irrational.


The branch of this argument that Mueller proposes carries much more weight. His description of how widespread societal fear can be detrimental is well formed and convincing. It is indeed difficult to argue that extensive fear among the masses could ever be beneficial. In reality, it has been proven is several cases other than 9/11 that societies stricken with widespread suffer politically and economically as a result. The real danger lies in the political sphere. We have seen several historical in which fearful populations have looked to extremist political leaders for respite only to wind up in a far worse situation.[17] Hitler and Stalin are excellent examples of this and even in our present day America this seems to be the case. Since 9/11 republican and democrat candidates for the presidency have been running on increasingly polarized campaign platforms in hopes of appealing to a fearful population.[18] Ultimately, fearful populations make poor decisions which yields a general societal downturn thereby decreasing the quality of life for all.


In his second major argument, Mueller suggests that terrorist threats in America should not longer be considered credible for if they were they would have already done so. He bases this claim by citing the case of 9/11, stating that it only took al Qaeda two years to plan and perform the attack. Like wise, if they were going to strike again they would want to do so quickly and that would mean it would have already happened. The other half of this argument is that while terrorist groups are capable of making insidious attacks on their targets, their resources restrict them from inflicting mass casualties and thus they should have no real impact. Both of these arguments propose novel ideas but seem to be somewhat displaced from reality. For example, it is difficult understand the rationale behind the “two years” model explained by Mueller. Why is it that any other attack to be carried out by terrorist should only have to take two years to prepare and execute and why would they have had to do so immediately? From lack of resources to waiting for the opportune moment, there are countless variables that could easily explain why another terrorist attack has not yet happened in America. In this regard, Mueller is mistaken. Likewise, the other half of this argument contains the same flaws as his first argument concerning irrational fear. Mueller believes that terrorist organizations should not be considered credible because they do not have the capacity to inflict mass casualties. This line of reasoning is flawed in two aspects. The first is that it relies upon the assumption that the goal of terrorist attack is to inflict mass casualties and not to display some symbolic defiance or dominance via fear mongering. In reality, the real goal of most terrorist action is not to kill or even to destroy, notwithstanding those are significant byproducts. The end goal is to make a statement by eliciting fear, creating a sense of uncertainty among the target population.[19] Before 9/11 the vast majority of Americans had likely never even considered that they could be the victims of a terrorist attack, however, now, eleven years later people are still looking over their shoulders wondering what might happen next. The second flaw fails to consider the human response to situations such as the attack on the World Trade Center. While it is true that relatively few people died in that attack, the scale and symbolism that went along with it caused sheer panic throughout the nation. It is not enough, as Mueller supposes, to simply tell the people that they are statistically unlikely to be killed by terrorists and therefore should not bother themselves by worrying about it. People need to see governmental reaction in such situation in order to feel that they are been protected. Whether that action is effective or not is initially irrelevant.[20]


Lastly, as is common to most of Mueller’s arguments, his critique of the capability of the current intelligence community in the U.S. has some valid points but lacks consideration to all aspects of the issue. He sees post 9/11 intelligence work to be expensive, inefficient and ineffective. While this claim is somewhat true, the fault in the matter does not rest solely, or even mostly, on the intelligence agencies and their directors but also on government official and legislators. Paul R. Pillar, a twenty-eight year veteran of the CIA, does an excellent job of describing that while the intelligence community does make occasional mistakes, it is the government leader who consistently make ill-advised decision against the advice of the intelligence directors. Thus, when something inevitably goes wrong, it is the intelligence agencies that take the blame. Pillar goes on to say, in disagreement with Mueller, that intelligence actually greatly improved after 9/11.


Having a veritable blank check for a decade makes a difference, of course. The big post-9/11 boom in the intelligence budget -- which has doubled since 2001, according to the Senate Intelligence Committee -- has at least marginally improved the odds of discovering the next nugget of information that will enable the United States to roll up a major terrorist plot or take down a bad guy. But it was the dramatic and obvious change in U.S. priorities following 9/11 that made the most difference. Counterterrorism, more than any other intelligence mission, depends on close collaboration with other governments, which have the critical firsthand knowledge, local police, and investigative powers that the United States usually lacks. Prior to 9/11, those governments' willingness to cooperate was often meager, especially when it meant discomfiting local interests. After 9/11, however, U.S. officials could pound on the desks of their foreign counterparts and say, "This time we really mean it." Some results of this sea change -- successes in freezing or seizing terrorists' financial assets, for example -- have been visible. Many others have been necessarily less so. Future success or failure in tracking threats such as anti-U.S. extremism in South Asia will similarly depend more on the state of U.S.-Pakistan relations than on the performance of the bureaucracy back in Washington.[21]






Pillar further describes how it is a myth that good intelligence can save us from bad surprises. In this argument he cites several examples and provides useful conclusions that act directly to refute the claims made by Mueller regarding the ineffectiveness of the intelligence community. Specifically he says, “Intelligence can help manage uncertainty, defining its scope and specifying what is known and what is likely to stay unknown. It can distinguish true uncertainty from simple ignorance by systematically assembling all available information, but it cannot eliminate uncertainty and it cannot prevent all surprises, including some big ones. Leaders must accept this reality; they must expect -- and prepare -- to be surprised.”[22] As an expert in the field, Pillar provides a detailed analysis of the reality of the intelligence communities’ ability to mitigate uncertainty and clearly shows what is a realistic expectation and what is not.

What can be determined from our examination of John Mueller’s ideas regarding the irrational fear of terrorism is essentially three-fold. First, we learned that while there are many statistical examples all pointing to the fact that there is a very miniscule chance dying in a terrorist attack, these examples fail to consider the true goals of terrorism. It is simple to present facts and figures and point out the rationality of a given situation, which is precisely what Mueller does. The unfortunately his point fails to consider that irrationality of human nature. That is to say, the vast majority of people will not be compelled to behave differently after examining the statistics. Therefore, Mueller’s argument, in that regard, lacks a certain amount of validity and strays too far from a middle-ground resolution that may find a solution to the problem of fear in America. Second, Mueller points out that terrorists should not be taken seriously as they have no real capability of inflicting mass casualties. As we have shown, the major flaw in this argument is related to the first in that it is misguided from the true point. The end goal of terrorist action is not necessarily to kill mass populations but rather to inflict fear and chaos amongst a population. Finally, we have shown that while Mueller feels that the intelligence community is largely a failure, that is in fact not the case. In truth, the various intelligence agencies of the United States have generally functioned quite well in providing government leaders with accurate intelligence. The failure has historically shown up when said leaders disregard or misuse the intelligence reports. Although Mueller does present true and valid points regarding the fear of terrorism, they are ultimately not useful in providing a solution to the problem.








[1] “Legislation Related to the Attack of September 11, 2001,” accessed, April 6, 2012 http://thomas.loc.gov/home/terrorleg.htm#one, In the spirit of Thomas Jefferson, legislative information from the Library of Congress.


[2] David Altheide, Terrorism and the Politics of Fear, (AltaMira Press, 2006), 120.


[3] John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Hardly Existential: Thinking About Terrorism Rationally,” Council on Foreign Relations, (2010): accessed April 6, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66186/john-mueller-and-mark-g-stewart/hardly-existential?page=show.


[4] John Mueller, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy,” Council on Foreign Relations, (2006): accessed April 6, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61911/john-mueller/is-there-still-a-terrorist-threat-the-myth-of-the-omnipresent-en?page=show.


[5] John Mueller, “Terrorphobia: Our False Sense of Security,” The American Interest, (2008): accessed April 3, 2012, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=418.


[6] John Mueller, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy,” Council on Foreign Relations.


[7] John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Hardly Existential: Thinking About Terrorism Rationally,” Council on Foreign Relations, (2010): accessed April 6, 2012.


[8] John Mueller, “Reacting to Terrorism: Probabilities, Consequences and the Persistence of Fear,” (paper presented at the National Convention for the International Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois, February 26, 2007 – March 4, 2007).


[9] John Mueller, “Reacting to Terrorism: Probabilities, Consequences and the Persistence of Fear.”


[10] Michael Sivak and Michael J. Flannagan, "Consequences for Road Traffic Fatalities of the Reduction in Flying Following September 11, 2001," Transportation Research Part F (2004).


[11] John Mueller, “Reacting to Terrorism: Probabilities, Consequences and the Persistence of Fear,”


[12] John Mueller, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy,” Council on Foreign Relations.


[13] John Mueller, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy,” Council on Foreign Relations.


[14] John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Terror Security and Money,” (paper presented at the Annual Convention of the Midwest Political Science Association Chicago, IL, April 1, 2011).


[15] John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Hardly Existential: Thinking About Terrorism Rationally,” Council on Foreign Relations.


[16] Satoshi Kanazawa, “Predictably Irrational, Yes; Explainably Irrational, No,” Psychology Today, October 18, 2009, http://www.psychologytoday.com (accessed April 8, 2012).


[17] James Taranto, “Fright-Wing Extremism,” The Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304410504575560041353681892.html (accessed April 8, 2012).


[18] “Why Are GOP Officials Embracing Extremists?” People for the American Way, July 25, 2009, http://www.pfaw.org/rww-in-focus/why-are-gop-officials-embracing-extremists-upcoming-how-to-take-back-america-conference (accessed April 7, 2012).


[19] Bryan Caplan, “Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model,” March 16, 2006, http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/bcaplan/pdfs/terrorism.pdf, (accessed April 5, 2012).


[20] Gary Cordner, “Reducing Fear of Crime: Strategies for Police,” U.S. Department of Justice, January, 2010, www.popcenter.org/library/reading/pdfs/ReducingFearGuide.pdf, (accessed April 3, 2012).


[21] Paul R. Pillar, “Think Again: Intelligence,” Foreign Policy Magazine, January 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/intelligence?page=full, (accessed April 7, 2012).


[22] Paul R. Pillar, “Think Again: Intelligence,” Foreign Policy Magazine.