Social Institutionalism

INTRODUCTION


Students of international relations often have had to grapple with the notion of classifying themselves as idealists or realists, but in this rapidly advancing age of international institutions and globalization, elements of both schools are present in the interactions of states within the international arena. While other authors have made attempts to reconcile the dichotomy that exists between realism and idealism, none have focused specifically on the role that institutionalism has had on the realist conception of the anarchic system. The goal of this study is to examine the extent to which states engage in the proposed idea of a newly formed international social contract and what effect institutions have had on this development. More specifically, I will examine the extent to which the development of international institutions has catalyzed the evolution of an international social contract wherein states voluntarily participate in a contract that provides security but requires rights.


Realism rests upon certain assumptions about the ways in which the international system work, all of which are essential in building a framework for understanding how realist theory understands recurring patterns in international relations. First, realists claim that the international system is anarchic. That is to say, that states interact in a system that has no regulating authority higher than that of the states themselves. Second, states are the principle actors in the previously described system and more specifically, most theorists are primarily concerned with the great power states and essentially disregard the weaker states. Third, states are unitary actors and always seek to pursue their own self-interests. This means that states are concerned with relative gains, as opposed to absolute gains, in the build up of power and resources. Finally, the primary goal of all states is survival, which can be problematic for several reasons. States primarily ensure survival through the build up of military power. When two or more states engage in this type of survival behavior the outcome is a dangerous, escalatory cycle known as the security dilemma. Another major problem is that of competition and interaction. As states seek to survive they compete for resources of all kinds. This competition will inevitably lead to interaction and conflict. In this sense, security becomes a zero-sum game concerned with relative gains. In other words, the amount of absolute power a state has is irrelevant. Realists are only concerned with how much more power a state has than the next (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 30).


While institutionalism is also a structural theory that claims states are rational actors, it lacks the inherent assumptions of realism. Rather, institutionalism prescribes conditions which can benefit states if they adhere to them. These conditions are first, institutions can provide information to states that they would otherwise not have access to. Access to information is incredibly important in understanding the correct action to pursue regarding inter-state relations. Second, institutions provide a means to reduce transaction costs. Institutions can serve as a regulating authority on state transaction thereby ensuring that undue costs are reduced for the parties involved. Third, institutions can help make commitments more credible. By imposing penalties, restrictions, sanctions and other constraints institutions can provide some standard of assurance that state-to-state commitments hold. Finally, institutions can serve as an epicenter for coordination in solving multilateral game problems. States are able to resolve the inherent problems in games like prisoner’s dilemma through the use of an institution (Keohane & Martin, 1995, p. 41).


The theory that I will set out to establish in this paper will not necessarily attempt to reconcile the discrepancies between realism and institutionalism, but rather recognize certain pertinent aspects of realist theory and also provide an acknowledgment of the influence and power that institutions have in the international system. More specifically, I will utilize certain aspects of the liberal and realist conceptions of anarchy to describe preexisting constraints on state behavior. Also, I will demonstrate how state interaction and socialization have lead to the institutionalization of international affairs as well as an international social contract similar to the one laid out by Jean Jacques Rousseau.


Notable comparisons can be made between social institutionalism and The Social Contract. A large portion of how this theory will conceptualize state behavior draws upon the ideas of the state of nature and the idea of a social contract as depicted by Rousseau. By outlining the history of the modern state, its evolution and contemporary existence, we will have established a base of knowledge about the unit of analysis in which we are studying and off which we may begin to build a theoretical framework around the idea of an international social contract. I will further demonstrate in some degree that modern nation states are indeed looking to establish some sense of international social order and legitimate political authority via the use of and adherence to the rules and regulations of international institutions. Finally, a description of how a legitimate political authority can be established and effective in an international setting. In essence, this paper will endeavor to show what is believed to be the next step in the evolution of international political system. Just as the Peace of Westphalia marked as systemic changed in international politics for hundreds of years with the creation of the nation state, so to will the evolution and adoption of an international political authority mark a drastic systemic change in international politics.






THE MODERN STATE


The modern state, like most things in the natural world, is the product of years of evolution, propagated by necessity of historical circumstance. In fact, the lineage of the modern state can be traced back to Sumerian city-states in 2500 BCE on through Greek city-sates, all the way up to the modern nation-states we have today (Baldwin, 2012). The question is, what is the next step in the evolutionary chain of the state. As will heretofore be shown, evolution in states typically involves them becoming larger and more unified. As history has shown, cities evolved into city-states. Later, city-states evolved into nation states after the peace of Westphalia in 1648. Contemporary events have shown that, at least to some degree, nation states are beginning to coalesce into continental unions. For example, the European Union has, for decades, attempted to design a unifying and legitimate political authority that outweighs the power and authority of individual states themselves. This evolutionary process has caused the modern state to develop certain attributes that are universally accepted among realist and liberal scholars. While most agree on the characteristics of the nation state, it should be noted that not all scholars agree on the assumptions about state behavior that accompany these characteristics but these will be discussed in a later section.


The first defining characteristic of the modern state is the conception of territory, especially when compared to the dynastic monarchies that preceded the modern state. The modern state views territory as essentially permanent and non-transferable. That is to say that no modern state would ever endow territory to another simply because of a marriage between the two, as was done in days of kings and kingdoms. Likewise, the vast majority of modern wars are better classified as border disputes and land grabs. In fact, the manner in which the modern state treats territory is rather unique when compared to other historical classifications of the state. The modern state is a security seeking entity that will use various means of power maximization in order to keep borders secure (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 32). Territory is essential to defining the modern state, as it is a key characteristic that sets it apart from previous geopolitical systems and organizations.


A second prominent characteristic of the modern state is sovereignty. Sovereignty as it pertains to the modern state is essentially the idea that an independent institution can relegate authority over a given geographical area. As such, this governing body is able to then enact laws that provide order and predictability in the society that exists within the geographical boundaries. Theoretically, the notion of a sovereign nation as was outlined by the likes of Hobbes, Locke, and other political thinkers, has always gone hand in hand with varying degrees of moral necessity on the part of the sovereign. Additionally, a sovereign nation can only be said to be so, if it retains the ability to secure the interests of its citizens. Consequently, failed states cannot be considered sovereign as they are incapable of securing such interests. The concept of sovereignty as it exists today comes in the form of Westphalian sovereignty. That is to say that there is a, “lack of other authority over state than the domestic authority (examples of such other authorities could be a non-domestic church, a non-domestic political organization, or any other external agent)” (Krasner, 2001, p. 6).


Third, in order for the modern state to exist, it must display a certain degree of legitimacy. That is, that the state’s governing body must be popularly accepted as such. Logically this makes absolute sense. In order to govern, the general will of the people needs to be in line with the governing body, otherwise the state will fall into administrative deadlocks and eventual collapse. Historically this has not always been the case. Many countries in Africa have had dictatorial regimes that have survived solely upon the support of a small elite group. This is not true legitimacy. It should be noted here, that according to Max Weber, a democratic regime is not a necessary condition of a legitimate state. A governing body that can be established via codified laws and cultural principles and not by means of popular vote are sufficient to establish a legitimate state government (Sternberger, 1968, p. 244). For example, a society may choose to shift from a rational, legal form of government, such as democratic republic, to the rule of a charismatic leader, in the same way the people of Germany came to be under the rule of Hitler and the Nazis. Despite the lack of freedoms and inherent lack of democracy under Hitler’s reign, it was in fact, still legitimate as his charismatic nature and powerful leadership won the hearts and minds of the people to such an extent so as to lead the country with their support.


Finally, the modern state exists a bureaucracy. Essentially, this means that states have some form of bureaucratic administration at the helm. The idea of the bureaucratization of the state was developed by a German sociologist, Max Weber, and outlined the conditions under which it would occur and also the side effects of the change in state administration (Mommsen, 1992 p. 46).


Weber explained that three conditions are necessary for bureaucratization to occur in a state. First, there must be an observed growth in population being overseen. Second, there must be an observed increase in complexity of the administrative tasks being that are being performed by the state. Third, the monetary economy of the state must be sufficiently complex so as to require a more efficient administrative system (Allan, 2010, p. 172). This means the day-to-day transactions of the state have become so complex that it requires a large administration to oversee and regulate it. Consequently, the development of communication technology has made more efficient methods of administration not only possible, but also in demand.


There are a few important characteristics of the modern state that have developed in more recent years. For example, one trait common to most modern states is the manner in which they act as mediums in promoting nationalism, economic success, and cultural identity. That is to say, that at no other time in history has a political system has been able to coalesce the interests of such large groups of people in achieving the same goals. In fact, “legitimate states that govern effective and dynamic industrial economies are widely regarded today as the defining characteristics of a modern nation-state.” (Kohil, 2004, p. 1). Likewise, one of the ways in which the modern state had such success in its self-development was through economic unit. By eliminating tariffs and other internal barriers to trade, the nation state was able to create and maintain economic unity that was in the best interest of every individual to pursue with vigor. Without these internal barriers, national trade networks began to form between the members of the nation. Thus, internal economic ties began to develop which in turn led to the development of national infrastructure systems such as transcontinental railroads and national highway systems. In concert with the development of these systems, nationalism itself began to mature and take form among the various states, further embedding the modern state as the new standard in geopolitical systems.


It is important to note that while these are characteristics common to all modern states, states themselves are each unique due to culture, nationalism, geographic location, and socialization (Keohane, 1977, p. 23). This is a major distinction between realism and institutionalism. Realists tend to “blackbox” the state, claiming that all states regardless of any unique trait they may have, will respond to the pressure of the anarchic system in exactly the same because anarchy forces them to do so. I disagree. State behavior is not a reflexive action to epiphenomenal pressures but it is the result of socialization and norms that are considered acceptable within the international community (Jackson, 2010, p 166). In this regard, states behave in a very similar manner to individuals. Problems continually arise and decisions are made according to what the social norms of behavior are regarding context and circumstance.


As we look closer at the development of international political authorities via the utilization of institutions, a clear understanding of the modern state as the unit of analysis for this research is essential. Specifically, understanding the characteristics of the modern state is necessary in understanding why they react to international pressures the way they do and why they behave in certain predictable patterns.





THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK


Like most international relations theories, social institutionalism rests upon bedrock assumptions about the nature of the world. Social institutionalism, like realism, assumes that the international system is anarchic. However, where most realists describe anarchy as being quite restraining upon state behavior, this theory posits anarchy as being much more permissive, to the point of self-destruction. That is to say, anarchy will permit states to cooperate to the point where they form hierarchical order among themselves that effectively removes the conditions of anarchy. This is a very important distinction as it separates this theory almost entirely from realism as it is optimistic that the nature of anarchy can indeed be changed.[1] As it stands, anarchy does indeed pose significant constraints upon the international system. States often find themselves in defensive positions due to other states balancing against them. Likewise, states often perceive threats to their own sovereignty that may not actually exist. These anarchic pressures often drive states towards conflict which rarely benefits any of the conflicting parties. As such, states have recently begun to search for a more efficient means to resolve potential conflicts which occurs via institutions. As states engage in cooperation via the use of institutions, the constraining effects of anarchy are diminished. As this behavior continues to repeat with greater frequency, anarchy is, in effect, defeated by establishing an institutional hierarchical order whereby states relinquish power to institutions as their new governing authorities. [2] This occurs in much the same fashion as we see in domestic politics and individuals. Individuals, are socialized actors that engage in a social contracts with their governments, agree to relinquish some of their individual rights in order to live in a world where security is provided by the government. Consequently, a predictable and lawful society is created where a certain amount of security is always present and when actors, violating the laws laid out by the regulating authority, are punished.


Second, states are socialized actors (not rational actors) that understand and respond to the evolution of societal norms of behavior. This means that state behavior is not entirely a response to the pressures of anarchy in the international system but rather that behaviors and reactions of the state are learn and mutually agreed upon within the international community. Thus, states occasionally do things that are not entirely rational but are congruent with the expected social norm in the given circumstance. We will see later that the United States is an excellent example of such behavior. Additionally, states under these conditions respond to and entertain requests from other states that are not necessarily in the state’s best interest but are mutually beneficial for both parties involved. In fact, the number of interstate wars involving great powers by century has steadily decreased since the 16th century. The following list, from Levy (1982, p. 580), shows the number of interstate wars involving great powers by century:


§ 1500’s – 38 wars


§ 1600’s – 29 wars


§ 1700’s – 21 wars


§ 1800’s – 20 wars


§ 1900’s – 17 wars.






Invasions and declarations of war were once commonplace but are heavily discouraged by the international community due to a change in behavioral norms. States have responded to this change by finding alternative means to achieve self-interests, such as international institutions and other non-governmental organizations. Due to human nature, imperfect statesmen produce imperfect foreign policy. States consistently misinterpret the intentions of other states often leading to conflict that could have otherwise been avoided. They often strive to behave rationally but the definition of rational comes from societal norms of behavior. Thus, we can see that the structure of the international system produces conditions wherein states interact with increasing frequency. Throughout these interactions, socialization occurs among the states creating determined norms of behavior that states conform to in order to avoid conflict. International institutions provide regulating power to enforce behavioral norms in the international system.


Third, states possess various forms of power and use them to achieve self-help initiatives. The common exception is if the state is the regional hegemon, in which case it consistently relinquishes power to international institutions and willingly restrains itself from freely dominating other states. Take for example the case of the United States after WWII. During this period of time the United States became a dominant hegemonic power for several decades and spent much of that time and millions of dollars developing and utilizing various international institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization (Department of State, 2010, p. 4). According to the realists and their conception of anarchy, such behavior does not make sense at all and is in fact, irrational. For a hegemonic power to willingly relinquish that power to the build up of international institutions is completely contrary to the realist view. Yet, in 2011 alone, the United States contributed over 24 million Swiss Francs to the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2013 p. 1) and 24 billion U.S. Dollars to multilateral development banks like the World Bank (Nelson, 2013, p. 6). Whether it is in the form of militaries, economic prowess, or relationships, states can use resources at their disposal to pursue goals that are in the interest of the state. Variables such as size of territory, population, access to natural resources, and capital lead to inequalities of power among the states. Powerful states then use these power inequalities to exploit their relationships with weaker states in order to gain advantages in trade. While this behavior is an improvement upon the more historic practice of invasion and enslavement, it still causes conflict among the states. As the role of institutions becomes more prominent, military power will carry less weight and coercive power will hold much more sway in the international system.


Fourth, survival is the primary goal of all states. Specifically what is meant by survival is that states strive to maintain, and often expand, their territory as well as control over their individual domestic politics. Historically, this has been pursued via power balancing and buck-passing to achieve a maximization of power or security (see Mearsheimer [2001] for more information on power balancing and buck-passing). States often felt most secure when they did all they could to be as strong as possible in terms of military might. This way, all potential threats would be deterred which is essential as one state cannot be certain of another’s intentions. In more contemporary times states have sought to ensure survival by engaging in the international social contract. States intentionally limit their own power and sovereignty to ensure survival. They achieve this security by subscribing to the regulating power of the international institutions that are more capable of interpreting state intentions and conveying information. Security is ensured by the regulating and restraining power of international institutions that states, through social norms of behavior, abide and obey. Again, this happens in the same manner as individuals engaging in the social contract. Outside the social contract the individual and the state have complete freedom to act for themselves and act against other but they also under constant threat from other individuals and states. By entering into the social contract states ensure their own survival because the hierarchical regulating authority provides security and order to what was previously an anarchic system.


By taking into account the assumptions that are now in place we can begin to build a theory that explains why states behave the way they do. Social institutionalism accounts for the pressures of anarchy that exist in the international system and acknowledges that those pressures are indeed real but also affirms that anarchy is not a perpetual state and that the solution to the problem of anarchy is hierarchy. That is to say, when an administrative hierarchical system is established and enforced, the pressures of anarchy no longer force the state to certain action because it is overridden by mutually agreed upon rules and norms of behavior. These rules and norms of behavior can only be established if the states are socialized actors. States are interacting with each other on a global scale with increasing frequency due to changes in technology. As the number of these interactions continues to increase, states have had to adopt certain norms of behavior if they are to be accepted by the international community and thus be privy to the rights and privileges that the community affords, such as trade relations and security alliances (see Keohane [2002] for an explanation on how international institutions benefit modern states). All of these actions are carried out because the state is interested in pursuing self-help initiatives. Ironically, states generally all want the same things, which are, security, stable economic growth, and predictability. As such, states are able to utilize institutions as the governing body to regulate and oversee these interactions to ensure that interactions are transacted in a mutually agreed upon fashion. This is where the state is now exercising power, via relationships and persuasion, when in a previous age it would have been done with threats and military force (Nye, 2004, p. 4). Consequently, this points to the waning usefulness of military power in the international system (see Nye [2004] for further explanation on soft power).


Finally, all of these actions are carried out because the main goal of the state is to ensure its own survival. Previously, the best way to do this was to build up massive armies and navies so as to dissuade any other state from attacking and also to legitimize any threats may be handed out. No longer is this the case. States have begun to realize that it is much safer and much less expensive to form social contracts on an international scale, that are regulated by institutions, to accomplish self-help initiatives.






THE SOCIAL CONTRACT


The social contract is not a unique concept to this theory. In fact, the manner in which the social contract applies to states within the international system is almost identical to the way in which it is laid out by Jean Jacques Rousseau in the Social Contract (see Rousseau [1913] for further explanation on the social contract, the state of nature, and individual rights and freedoms within civil societies). The purported goal of the Social Contract is to decide whether it is possible to have a legitimate political authority. For the purposes of this paper, we will examine whether there can be a legitimate international political authority or hierarchical regulating authority. In order for the state to be more efficient and disassociate itself from the conditions of anarchy, it must engage in a social contract with other states wherein all are afforded the same rights and privileges but all must agree to give up other certain rights and privileges. Naturally, this notion of giving up rights runs contrary to the idea of state sovereignty but that is that sacrifice that must be made in order to gain the benefits provided by the social contract. That being said, no state enjoys the idea of sacrifice, so the contract must ensure that all states are free within the contract in the same way that citizens are free in a republic or democracy. Additionally, while this social contract will impose new laws upon states to regulate behavior and safeguard the states, the contract must allow for individual states to leave the contract and return the state of anarchy that they once existed in. Some indecision among the states regarding the benefits of the social contract and this can be observed in the current international system (see Table 1). While some states subscribe to the rules and regulations of international institutions, others have difficulty relying upon the institutions to guarantee transactions and end up acting in a unilateral fashion regardless of the prescriptions of thin institutions. However, the number of transactions that are regulated through international institutions is steadily increasing and there is a pattern of obedience beginning to emerge among the states as they utilize institutions. In fact, the number of countries participating in the UN for example, has continued to increase every since its inception in 1945. Originally there were 51 members but as of 2011 those numbers have swelled to 193 members (UN, 2011, p. 1). Additionally, there are now over 75 major international institutions regulating interstate interaction (UMDNJ, 2010, p. 1). These are just two examples of the rapid growth that international institutions are experiencing, which begs the question, why? The international social contract would suggest that it is because these institutions are providing a public good at a fair price and it has become beneficial to jump on the bandwagon where safety is more certain, freedoms are more equal, and transactions are more fair. All that is required is to live by the rules and norms of the contract. Eventually, just as individuals have subscribed to a regulating authority to mitigate transactions and deter conflict, states will fully subscribe to the regulating authority of a hierarchical international institution.


In the social institutionalism model, the state exists in an anarchic world, much like the state of nature described by Rousseau. Essentially, the state is free to pursue self-interests, maximize power without restraint, and do what it feels is necessary to ensure its own survival. This leads to a world in which states will inevitably conflict with each other due to competition for resources such as territory. This is the same situation the individual found himself in, born free and everywhere in chains. While the state is free to pursue self-interests, so to is every other state and that puts all states at risk. In order to combat this risk, states have first tried to engage in conquest but as societal norms of behavior have changed conquest has not only become more difficult but also unacceptable. Thus, states are forced to pursue more efficient forms of ensuring survival and this happens via institutions or hierarchical regulating authorities. In the absence of political order and law within the international system, all states have unlimited natural freedoms and a right to all things which will result in an endless war of all against all (Hobbes, 1988, p. 113).


In the face of such a fearful world it is no wonder that states have begun to engage in the social contract. As such states have turned their attentions from quarreling and warring with each other in search of a legitimate international political authority. The historical evidence as well as the overall shift in international social norms from antagonistic to cooperative shows that there is a change occurring within in the international system and this change is the international social contract. By doing so states con learn to bind themselves to one another via trade relationships and other interactions that require socialization while still maintaining freedom under international laws. These laws incentivize states to remain loyal to the social contract so that freedoms as well as safety may be maintained.






LEGITIMATE POLITICAL AUTHORITY


To build a functional international society, the individual states must share a certain degree of common interests. Fortunately, everything that we understand of the international system tells us that states do in fact share common interest and likewise, the theoretical framework of social institutionalism assumes that states share the common interest of survival. As we observed, increased state interaction has lead to the development of societal norms of behavior that have greatly impacted the manner in which states interact with on another (Goodman, 2004, p. 10). Also, these norms of behavior are rooted in the states’ self interests. As states continue to interact more frequently these norms become more embedded and states must look to new methods of mitigating conflict in order to uphold the ever evolving social norms of behavior. Thus, a legitimate political authority must be established in order to regulate the interactions among states and preserve rights and freedoms while maintaining peace and security.


The legitimate political authority must ensure freedoms and allow state to be free as well as impose and enforce laws. In order to accomplish this, there must first be a consensus among the states as to what constitutes freedom and law. States should each produce a representative or ambassador that represents the general will of the population as well as the legislative power of the state. It will be the work of these representatives to establish the governing body of the legitimate international political authority. Various positions of government office will be established but more importantly, these delegates will collectively decide and codify what are the international freedoms to be guaranteed to every state of the social contract and what are the laws that will be put in place to protect and safeguard those freedoms (Rousseau, 1913, p. 206).


Rousseau provides several recommendations on how to establish and define these laws. First, Rousseau articulates law as an abstract desire of the general population that is universally applicable. The laws that currently exist in states throughout the world are generally made by the populace and applied to the populace as a whole. As such, the law applies to generalities and is incapable of dealing with the particularities of individuals or groups. This is a beneficial feature of law as it maintains equality by not allowing individuals or groups to steamroll the legitimate international political authority into catering to the needs of the minority while neglecting the majority. Rousseau further instructs that the law is essentially a record of what the people collectively desire, thus the role for the individual state ambassadors. The only time that a law can be enacted is when it is collectively agreed upon and applied to all participants, in other words, equal in design and application (Rousseau, 1913, p. 27).


Rousseau provides one more recommendation on establishing laws. States must establish laws and apply them during a time of relative peace and prosperity. Doing otherwise is dangerous, as the establishment of news leaves states temporarily vulnerable and a lack of peace or prosperity leaves potential for volatility (Rousseau, 1913, p. 28).


That being said, institutions are likely the only possible means for decreasing systemic volatility because they are capable of changing the conditions under which states must operate. For example, institutions are capable of acting as mediators that can pass along information that state would have never had access to without the use of an institution. As a result, there is virtually no room any longer for on state to misinterpret the intentions of another and thus, conflict can be avoided to a greater degree. Likewise, international institutions have the capability to make inter-state commitments more credible by imposing penalties, restrictions, sanctions and other constraints upon violating parties. For this strategy to be successful the benefits of working in concert with the international institution must be substantial enough that the threat of expulsion from the institution would thwart any violating behavior. Finally, international institutions serve as arbitrators for the coordination in solving multilateral game problems such as prisoner’s dilemma (Keohane, 1984, p. 50). The problem in the game of prisoner’s dilemma is that neither player is able to communicate with the other and in order to secure a better deal for themselves, each player will defect and neither player will gain the best possible outcome which is only attainable through communication and guaranteed cooperation. International institutions can ensure this communication and cooperation.


While the establishment of a legitimate international political authority is yet in its infancy, the effects of such an institutions are seen worldwide. Already, the various international institutions of the world have begun to coalesce in their aims, ambitions and even locations. All one has to do is look at the city of Geneva, Switzerland and observe that there are 14 major international institutions that have headquartered there, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).


While these institutions have no means of ensuring state obedience to their rules of operation with military force, due to socialization and social norms of behavior such a requirement is unnecessary. As was previously shown, states are beginning to utilize means of conflict resolution other than war. This is all part and parcel of the waning usefulness of military might. As states continue to develop the social contract further and more heavily rely upon the governing power of international institutions, use of military action becomes increasingly more damaging to the state’s international reputation. As a result, the state loses future bargaining power with the legitimate political authority and has consequently weakened their position in the international community (Schneider, 2006, p. 3). Thus, in lieu of military force, states have begun to use various forms of soft power with increasing frequency. They make appeals and file claims with the various international institutions which then sanction and reprimand the party at fault and while it is understood that this method is not perfect in the way it solves problems, it has greatly reduced the number of armed conflicts among the great powers. States obey institutions of their own volition because they have collectively come to understand that it is a far better choice to participate in the social contract via institutions that it is to brave the dangerous anarchic world on their own.






EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS


The data used in this section shows the effectiveness international institutions have had on conflict management. In Table 1, 1,688 cases of international institutions attempting to manage inter-state conflict were analyzed and the resulting data was produce (Hansen et al., 2006, p. 35). In 56 percent of cases, international institutions were able to reach agreements with the conflicting states. With such a minimal bias, we cannot state that institutions are completely effective in stopping inter-state conflict. That being said, when agreements are made, institutions have had great success in assuring that states comply with the terms of the agreements. Likewise, only 23 percent of agreements ended in issue claims made by one of the conflicting states and in only 15 percent of cases resulted in the challenging state making greater concessions than the target state during the terms of the agreement (Hansen et al., 2006, p. 22).






Table 1: The Effectiveness of Conflict Management by


International Institutions, 1816-2001






Note: From Mediating Interstate Conflicts: Regional vs. Global International Organizations (p. 35) by Hansen et al., Iowa City: University of Iowa





While demonstrating the probability of an international institution reaching an agreement, Table 2 also shows:


Structured organizations with assemblies, bureaucracies, and formal rules experience greater success in their conflict management efforts, raising the likelihood of agreement from 0.51 to 0.76. The most institutionalized IGOs, or interventionist organizations, are extremely successful as conflict managers producing a very high rate of agreement at 0.92. Our results demonstrate that the institutional characteristics of the organization influence their success rates. Even when focusing on binding techniques, less institutionalized IGOs experience significantly lower rates of success in producing agreements. Thus among potential IGO conflict managers, the most highly institutionalized organizations have a clear advantage for getting disputing parties to reach agreement, especially when they employ binding techniques. (Hansen, et al., 2006, p. 24)






The data contained in Tables 1 and 2 effectively shows that institutions have greater success in brokering agreements between contentious states then do states themselves. That being said, it is important to note that levels of democratization, preference similarity, and institutionalization positively affect the success an institution successfully mediating an agreement between two or more contentious states. Thus, it is clear that institutions are not equally capable of fostering cooperation and mitigating conflict among states with lower levels of democratization, and institutionalization (Hansen et al., 2006, p. 27).


















Table 2: Predicted Probability of International Institution (IGO) Settlement


Attempt and Reaching Agreement






Note: From Mediating Interstate Conflicts: Regional vs. Global International Organizations (p. 38) by Hansen et al., Iowa City: University of Iowa














CONCLUSION


Two conclusions are derived from social institutionalism. First, due to socialization and frequent interaction, states have begun to engage in an international social contract. For a long time states have existed in a state of nature where all have unlimited freedom act as they please. This lead to competition for territory and resources and an anarchic world in which there was no ordering power above that of the state. States became distrustful and even fearful of one another in this world have since developed a way to regulate interaction to make it safe and fair and this is done by international institutions. As the effects of globalization and technological innovation continue to make interaction among the states more frequent, states have adopted certain social norms of behavior and these norms generally determine what is acceptable and what is unacceptable behavior for a state to pursue within the international system. With these norms of behavior in place, states have outlined a social contract by which they utilize international institutions and gain benefits from them but at the same time give up some of the freedoms that existed in the anarchic world. This is the trade off. While all states are now more certain of the world around them and the states in the world, it is no longer acceptable from them to do as they wish at all times. The social contract demands that states behave accordingly or risk being denied the inherent benefits of it.


Second, the social contract has lead to the formation of international institutions that add hierarchical organization to an anarchic world, thereby increasing security, safety, and certainty for every state at the cost of certain freedoms. This makes for a more stable and peace prone international system due to its changed nature. That is, there is now a regulating authority or legitimate political authority that can put measures in place to ensure that the developed social norms of behavior is not violated among the states during interactions. While international institutions cannot invade or destroy a state with military power, such action is not entirely necessary as sanctions and reprimands are often enough to coerce the state to abide by the rules values and norms that the institutions uphold due to the nature of the social contract.


This theory of social institutionalism as it yet stands is under-developed and requires much more research and examination into the ideas of systemic change, the waning usefulness of military power, the development of the international social contract, and many others. That being said, it does draw attention to many important aspects of international relations that have previously lacked consideration. More importantly, it shows that there is a continuing shift in the way in which states interact with each other. Social interactions, whether it be on the individual or state level, is an ever evolving process. Manners, customs, greetings and other norms of behavior will continue to change as the world moves forward and as such it becomes important to be observant of the way in which states change they way they respond to one another’s actions. With careful observation it becomes apparent that states are indeed changing they way they interact with each other and that social contracts and international institutions will continue to play an increasingly vital role in the future.


































REFERENCES


Allan, K. D. (2010). Explorations in classical sociological theory (2nd ed.). Thousand Oakes, CA: Pine Forge Press.


Baldwin, R., (2012) Mesopotamia: The first civilization. Retrieved from: http://socsci.gulfcoast.edu/rbaldwin/mesopotamia.htm.


Goodman, R. & Jinks, D. (2004) How to influence states: Socialization and international human rights law. Duke Law Journal, Vol. 54, 7-15.


Hansen, H. et al., (2006) Mediating interstate conflicts: Regional vs. global international organizations. Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa.


Hobbes, T. & Macpherson, C. (1988) Leviathan. London: Penguin.


Jackson, R. H., & Sørensen, G. (2010). Introduction to international relations: Theories and approaches. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.


Keohane, R. (1984) After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.


Keohane, R., (2002) Global governance and democratic accountability. Durham, NC: Duke University, p.25.


Keohane, R. & Martin, L. (1995) The promise of institutionalist theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.


Keohane, R. & Nye, J. (1977) Power and interdependence: World politics in transition. Boston, MA: Little Brown and Company.


Kohli, A. (2004) State-directed development: Political power and industrialization in the global periphery. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.


Krasner, S. D., (2001). Problematic sovereignty: contested rules and political possibilities. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.


Levy, J. S. (1982) The contagion of great power war behavior. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, 562-584.


Mearsheimer, J. (2001) The tragedy of great power politics. New York, NY: Norton.


Mommsen, Wolfgang J., (1992). The political and social theory of max weber: Collected essays. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.


Nelson, R., (2013) Multilateral development banks: U.S. contributions FY2000-FY2013. Retrieved from: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20792.pdf.


Nye, J. (2004) Soft power: The means to success in world politics. New York, NY: Public Affairs Publishing.


Rousseau, J. J. (1913) Social Contract & Discourses. New York, NY: E. P. Dutton & Co.






Sternberger, D., (1968) Legitimacy. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 9, 244.


Schneider, C. J., (2006) Weak states and institutionalized bargaining power in international organizations. Retrieved from: http://polisci2.ucsd.edu/cjschneider/articles/pdf/WeakStates-W03E.pdf.


UMDNJ. (2010) List of international Organizations. Retrieved from: http://www.umdnj.edu/uroweb/international_office/generalinfo/ListofInternationalOrganizations.pdf.


United States Department of State. (2010). United States contributions to international organizations. Retrieved from: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/199431.pdf.


United Nations. (2012). Growth in United Nations Membership 1945-present. Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/en/member/growth.shtml.


World Trade Organization (2013). Members contributions to the secretariat and to the appellate body for year the 2011. Retrieved from: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/contrib_e.htm.





































































[1] Optimism and pessimism are terms commonly used to describe how liberals and realists regard the anarchic nature of the international system. Realists are pessimistic because they believe anarchy cannot be overcome whereas liberals feel the opposite.


[2] Domestic governments overcame anarchy within their countries by establishing hierarchical systems of government. The same logic applied to the international system suggests that international anarchy can also be overcome by establishing a hierarchical system.